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ROMER v. EVANS AND INVIDIOUS INTENT
Andrew Koppelman'"
In this Essay, Professor Koppelman argues that, notwithstanding numerous
scholarly claims to the contrary, the Supreme Court's decision in Romer v.
Evans was based on the invalidated law's impermissible purpose.
Professor Koppelman examines the Court's understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and concludes that its current doctrine is designed to ferret out
unconstitutional intent. Such impermissible intent, Koppelman argues, was
evident in the law challenged in Romer. Nonetheless, Koppelman acknowledges,
Romer is a hard case, and its precedential significance is unclear, particularly
in light of Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld the constitutionality of laws
against homosexual sodomy. Laws that facially disadvantage gays, he argues,
will always reflect both impermissible prejudice and permissible moral judge-
ments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws that discriminate against gays will always be demonstrably rational,
because such laws will always further the state's legitimate moral objection to
homosexual sodomy. Thus teaches Bowers v. Hardwick.1 Laws that discrimi-
nate against gays will always be constitutionally doubtful, however, because
. The following five works were written for a symposium sponsored by the William
& Mary Bill of Rights Journal and the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
.. Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University. An
earlier draft of this Essay was presented at the Association of American Law Schools
Annual Meeting, January 1997. For helpful comments, I am grateful to the audience
and to my fellow panelists, especially Akhil Amar. Douglas Laycock also provided use-
ful comments on an earlier draft, and I have benefited from conversations with Robert
P. George, Lino Graglia, Samuel Issacharoff, and Cass Sunstein. Thanks, also, to
Madeline Morris for her assistance, long ago, with my research into the lower federal
courts' use of the intent test. It has finally borne fruit. Finally, this Essay is gratefully
dedicated to the members of the ReligionLaw list on the internet, with whom I argued
the merits of Romer in the days after it was handed down; this Essay grows out of what
I wrote then, and attempts to address objections that were raised there. A disclosure:
during the trial in Romer, I advised the plaintiffs' attorneys and agreed to be listed as a
potential expert witness on the plaintiffs' side, but was never called to testify.
' 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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they will always arouse suspicion that they rest on a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group. Thus teaches Romer v. Evans.2 Both of these
teachings are coherent, and neither of them is necessarily inconsistent with the
other. They leave the courts, however, with a doctrinal dilemma that has no
obvious solution.
In order to sustain this claim, I must defend the reading of Romer just stat-
ed. This puts me into a thicket of constitutional argument. The scholarly reac-
tion to Romer v. Evans has been remarkable. The Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by an
2amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited antidiscrimination pro-
tection of gays, because "the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class that it affects."3 The Court's inference of unconstitu-
tional animus was central to its holding, but almost no scholar who has read the
opinion has been willing to believe that this was what really was going on.
Some think that the Court was sub silentio following the Colorado Supreme
Court's theory that the Amendment impaired gays' "right to participate equally
in the political process."4 Ronald Dworkin and Robert Bork, who rarely agree,
2 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
Id. at 1627.
4 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993). The losing counsel in the
case so reads it. See Timothy M. Tymkovich et al., A Tale of Three Theories: Reason
and Prejudice in the Battle Over Amendment 2, 68 COLO. L. REV. 287, 333 (1997). So
does Justice Scalia in his dissent.
The central thesis of the Court's reasoning is that any group is denied equal pro-
tection when, to obtain advantage (or, presumably, to avoid disadvantage), it must
have recourse to a more general and hence more difficult level of political
decisionmaking than others.
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Pamela Karlan is similarly persuaded
that "the core of the injury to gays and lesbians concerned the political process."
Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 Hous.
L. REV. 289, 296 (1997); see also Carol M. Swain, Not "Wrongful" By Any Means:
The Court's Decisions in the Redistricting Cases, 34 Hous. L. REV. 315, 316 (1997)
(endorsing Karlan's reading of Romer). For another scholarly reading of Romer that
comes close to finding this principle in the majority opinion, see Nicholas S. Zeppos,
The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel, Premature Predation, and the Components of
Political Identity, 50 VAND. L. REV. 445 (1997). Zeppos says he is concerned only with
statewide laws that thwart the formation of distinctive local political communities, but
all constitutional restrictions on municipal law do this. For example, the religion clauses
of the First Amendment forestall the formation of local theocracies. Note should also be
taken here of Caren Dubnoff, who argues that the Court should have relied on the theo-
ry adopted by the court below. See Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Legal and
Political Analysis, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 275 (1997).
The difficulty with any argument of this sort is that pointed out by Justice Scalia:
[I]t seems to me most unlikely that any multilevel democracy can function under
such a principle. For whenever a disadvantage is imposed, or conferral of a bene-
fit is prohibited, at one of the higher levels of democratic decisionmaking (i.e., by
the state legislature rather than local government, or by the people at large in the
[Vol. 6:1
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both think that Romer holds that the law may not draw moral distinctions based
on the sexual practices of consenting adults.' Cass Sunstein similarly thinks
"[t]he underlying judgment in Romer must be that, at least for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause, it is no longer legitimate to discriminate against homo-
sexuals as a class simply because the state wants to discourage homosexuality
or homosexual behavior."6 Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry claim that Romer
stands for a narrowly confined "pariah principle," which "forbids the govern-
ment from designating any societal group as untouchable."7 Others think that
the case "discovered a ... sweeping right for all citizens to be free from all
private discrimination," which would imply that any state antidiscrimination law
"would be required to include gays (and Republicans, and left-handed people)
on the list of protected classes."' Louis Michael Seidman finds a slightly more
modest equality principle, under which the state's obligation to protect gays
from discrimination "holds only so long as Colorado continues to provide pro-
tection for other vulnerable groups."9 Still others think that the law's problem
is that it singles out a named class to suffer a disadvantage." The editors of
state constitution rather than the legislature), the affected group has (under this
theory) been denied equal protection.
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia is right to deem this princi-
ple "ridiculous," id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and it was expressly repudiated by
the Court, which declared that it affirmed the judgment "on a rationale different from
that adopted by the State Supreme Court." Id. at 1624. Professor Karlan concedes that if
Romer is read this way, one must infer that the decision "awards the victors a quasi-
property right in prior political success without ever determining whether that success
was a constitutional entitlement or whether the pre-existing system was fair." Karlan,
supra, at 293.
' See Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 8,
1996, at 49; ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 112-14 (1996). They
disagree about whether the holding in Romer is correct.
6 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4,
62 (1996).
' Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY
257, 258 (1996).
8 Editorial, Taking the Initiative, NEW REPUBLIC, June 10, 1996, at 8. One reading
of the amicus brief filed in Romer by Lawrence Tribe and his colleagues would attrib-
ute this view to them. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
9 Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren
Court Activism, 1996 Sup. Cr. REV. 67, 89 n.80. Even this modified principle is not a
very modest one, since it would invalidate legislation whose constitutionality seems
beyond question. "The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on some
characteristics, but not sexual orientation. It seems indisputable that this limitation does
not render the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional." Anthony M. Dillof, Romer v. Evans
and the Constitutionality of Higher Lawmaking, 60 ALB. L. REV. 361, 365 (1996) (foot-
notes omitted); see also Karlan, supra note 4, at 295.
10 The principal proponents of this view are Akhil Amar and (based upon another
reading of their amicus brief) the Tribe group. Their arguments are considered below.
See infra text accompanying notes 147-49 and 154-61.
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the Harvard Law Review take a similar line, but stress the nature of the disad-
vantage: "The Court founded its decision on a rule that legislation making it
more burdensome for a single group of citizens to seek the government's pro-
tection is a per se denial of equal protection of the laws."'" Richard Duncan
and Roderick Hills, who filed briefs on opposite sides in the case, both think
that the law was invalidated because it was overbroad." Larry Alexander at-
tempts to understand it as an exercise of ordinary equal protection analysis,
though he concedes that under that analysis the result the Court reached is diffi-
cult to defend.13 To my knowledge, however, no one has been willing to sug-
gest that the Court might have meant what it said: that the Amendment was
invalid because of its impermissible purpose.
In this Essay, I will argue that Romer is defensible in the terms on which it
was decided. The opinion is concededly "puzzling and opaque."' 4 There are, as
Lynn Baker has observed, "missing pages."' 5 I will try to supply those pages
and explain why they were absent from the opinion, without throwing away any
of the pages that are there. I will offer a parsimonious defense of the decision,
discarding as little as possible of the reasoning actually set forth by the Court
and adding as little as possible regarding what the Court did not say. 6
' The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 155, 163
(1996) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (footnote omitted). This is yet another possible read-
ing of the Tribe group's amicus brief.
" See Richard Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent
Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response to Professor Koppelman, 6
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147, 151 & n.24 (1997); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amend-
ment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar's Analysis of
Romer, 95 MICH. L. REV. 236, 238 (1996).
See Larry Alexander, Better Boring and Correct: Romer v. Evans as an Exercise
of Ordinary Equal Protection Analysis, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (1997).
14 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 9. Other writers, even those friendly to the result, have
been similarly critical of the opinion. See Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68
COLO. L. REV. 429, 429 n.2 (1997) (collecting articles).
"5 Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 387 (1997). In attempting to supply those pages, I am not disput-
ing Janet Halley's cogent observation that the Court's silences are themselves signifi-
cant and deserving of study. See Halley, supra note 14, at 388.
16 These parameters exclude the interpretation of the decision offered by Professor
Duncan, who argues that the case was decided on overbreadth grounds. See Duncan,
supra note 12, at 147, 151 & n.24. Duncan's analysis ignores the fact that the passages
emphasizing the Amendment's breadth were only steps in the argument leading to the
conclusion that the law's purpose was impermissible. Duncan has nothing to say about
the passages throughout the opinion discussing the law's intent. Moreover, it would be
hard to defend the opinion on the grounds Duncan offers. Duncan has argued elsewhere
that, if the Court had considered only the likely applications of the law, no overbreadth
challenge could have been sustainable. See Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the
Kulturkampf. Supreme Court Storytelling, the Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 353-55 (1997). Finally, Duncan does not attempt to answer
the defense of Romer that is offered here. He does not dispute that invidious animus
ROMER v. EVANS AND INVIDIOUS INTENT
Romer is a case about impermissible purpose. It fits quite comfortably into
a body of doctrine that has made the concept of purpose fundamental to the
adjudication of equal protection claims. The missing pages can easily be filled
in by the reader, who need only take note of the hatred and stereotyping of
gays that has been ubiquitous in American culture for a long time. Once this
obvious cultural fact is recognized as part of the context in which the Colorado
amendment was enacted, the Court's attribution of invidious purpose to the law
makes eminent sense.
The filling of this ellipsis has implications that go well beyond Romer. The
Court's opinion implicitly invokes a defect in the political process that contami-
nates, at least to some extent, all laws that discriminate against gays. That con-
tamination, however, implies that gays ought to be a "suspect class,"17 and that
laws discriminating against gays should be presumptively unconstitutional. The
principal doctrinal obstacle to this conclusion is Hardwick, which held that a
state can have a legitimate moral interest in prohibiting homosexual conduct."
Hardwick established that a state will always have an innocent explanation for a
law that discriminates against gays. Romer implicitly recognized that the wide-
spread animus against gays (which is not the same thing as moral objection to
homosexual conduct) undermines, to an extent that is hard to determine, the
credibility of such explanations. The constitutional status of laws that discrimi-
nate against gays, therefore, is uncertain after Romer.
Begin by looking at the bare bones of what the Court said in Romer. Romer
involved an amendment to the Colorado Constitution (referred to on the ballot
as "Amendment 2"), which provided that neither the state nor any of its subdi-
visions could prohibit discrimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."' 9 In his opinion for
against gays exists and is constitutionally relevant.
17 I use this term because its use is ubiquitous and it is an obvious way of describ-
ing the referent of a "suspect classification," but put it in scare quotes because it is
perhaps the most infelicitous locution in constitutional law. Victims of discrimination
are not themselves suspected of anything.
1 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
'9 The full text of the Amendment follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall en-
act, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homo-
sexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-exe-
cuting.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, cited in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
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the Court, Justice Kennedy observed that the Amendment "has the peculiar
property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group."2 This was unusual, and called for "careful consideration to determine
whether [this law was] obnoxious to the constitutional provision."21 The State
defended the law by citing "respect for other citizens' freedom of association,
and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or
religions objections to homosexuality."' The Amendment, however, was
"[n]ot confined to the private sphere."' The State also cited "its interest in
conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups. '24 The
Amendment, however, seemed to "deprive[] gays and lesbians even of the pro-
tection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in
governmental and private settings."' Such a universal license to discriminate
against gays "would compound the constitutional difficulties the law creates. 26
"The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular justifi-
cations that we find it impossible to credit them. 27
The Court thus felt compelled to "conclude that Amendment 2 classifie[d]
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal
to everyone else."28 The broad disability imposed on a targeted group
raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage im-
posed is born of animosity toward the class of persons af-
fected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection
of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean
that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."29
Romer's rule of decision may thus be summarized as follows: If a law tar-
gets a narrowly defined group and then imposes upon it disabilities that are
so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no discernible relationship to any
legitimate governmental interest, then the Court will infer that the law's
purpose is simply to harm that group, and so will invalidate the law.
0 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
21 Id. at 1628 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38
(1928)). It appears that "careful consideration" is a synonym for heightened scrutiny.
2 Id. at 1629.
Id. at 1626.
24 Id. at 1629.
2 Id. at 1626.
Id. The majority opinion argued with Justice Scalia's dissent about whether a
saving construction, eliminating the unconstitutional applications, had authoritatively
been placed upon Amendment 2 by the Colorado Supreme Court. See id.
27 Id. at 1629.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
[Vol. 6:1
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How defensible is this inference? Justice Scalia thought that, far from
manifesting a bare desire to harm gays, the Amendment was "rather a mod-
est attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual
mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those
mores through use of the laws."' "The Court's portrayal of Coloradans as
a society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled 'gay-bashing' is so false as to
be comical."'"
Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate
any human being or class of human beings. But I had
thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensi-
ble-murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to ani-
mals-and could exhibit even "animus" toward such con-
duct. Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at issue here:
moral disapproval of homosexual conduct .... "
The inference of impermissible motive, Scalia thought, was therefore un-
called for. Justice Scalia concluded that the Court's opinion, "disparaging as
bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes," was "nothing short of insult-ing.'33
Whether the Court correctly decided Romer (at least, according to the
rationale on which the Court relied) would seem to depend on whether the
Court's inference of animus was justified. As Justice Scalia's response
shows, however, any answer to that question is likely to rest on an unspo-
ken response to other, more fundamental questions: Why does motive mat-
ter, and what sort of motivation renders a law unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Only after we have
determined just what the "animus" is that is prohibited, and why it is pro-
hibited, can we even begin to determine whether such animus underlay
Colorado's Amendment 2.
Part I of this Essay examines the way in which the Court has understood
the Fourteenth Amendment. I shall show that the Fourteenth Amendment
analysis that now prevails is best understood as a means of pursuing uncon-
stitutional intent. I then consider the reasons for so understanding the Equal
Protection Clause, and how these reasons, in light of certain institutional
constraints, justify the present doctrinal structure, which rarely focuses di-
rectly on intent.
Part II then examines the way in which the Court decided Romer. I will
claim that the Court was wrong to say that no innocent explanation could be
30 Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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offered for the Amendment. The logic that led to the inference of animus
was incomplete; there was a gap in the reasoning. Nonetheless, in the con-
text of the widespread hatred and stereotyping that constitutes, in significant
part, the stigmatization of homosexuality in contemporary American society,
it would have been inappropriate for the Court to apply only minimal scruti-
ny to a law that on its face singled out gays for special disadvantage.
Part III addresses the problem of reconciling Romer and Hardwick. I
conclude that Romer is a hard case because the Court is presented with an
unsolvable tangle of permissible and impermissible motives. This difficulty,
moreover, is not confined to Romer, but is likely to be present whenever a
court must adjudicate an equal protection challenge to a law that facially
disadvantages gays. Given this tangle, it is unsurprising that the Court did
not even suggest in its opinion that, as a general matter, laws discriminating
against gays would be subjected to heightened scrutiny. After Romer, how-
ever, it is clear that minimal scrutiny cannot be the answer, either.
II. HOW AND WHY THE COURT FOCUSES ON INVIDIOUS INTENT
A. The Court's Equal Protection Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision
as prohibiting arbitrary discrimination, or treating similar things dissimilarly.
Without more, this produces a very deferential standard of judicial review.
"The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."35 Because this stress on mere rationality threatens
to transform the Clause into a minor protection against legislative careless-
ness,36 the Clause has been given teeth in cases where the challenged clas-
sification is based on race: "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.""' When legislation
employs such classifications, "these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and
will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest."38 This higher level of scrutiny has been justified with the
explanation that race is "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legiti-
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
36 Perhaps not even against that, since any statute's terms suggest a purpose that the
statute rationally serves. See Robert Nagel, Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and
Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
3' Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
31 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (1985).
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mate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are
not as worthy or deserving as others."39 Almost no legislation has been
able to satisfy that test, whereas almost any legislation can meet "minimal
scrutiny," which asks whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.40 In the 1970s, the Court devised a third, intermediate level
of scrutiny: classifications based on sex41 or illegitimacy42 are what has
been infelicitously called "quasi-suspect;" they "will survive equal protection
scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state inter-
est."43 The Court has not, however, explained how it is determined whether
a given type of classification is suspect or quasi-suspect.44 Moreover, it has
been noted that the insistence on a close fit between the means and the end,
varying in strictness with the level of scrutiny, has only an indirect relation
to the evils of racial oppression against which the Clause was originally
enacted.45 As for cases in which a law does not overtly employ a suspect
classification, but disproportionately harms blacks, the Court has said that
there is no constitutional violation unless the legislators were motivated by
discriminatory intent.46
The prevailing understanding of equal protection builds on the famous
footnote four of Carolene Products, which declared that "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
39 Id.
0 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
41 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
42 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
41 Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
" See JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 260-64 (1983).
4' See Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREF-
ERENTIAL TREATMENT 84-123 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977). It is sometimes ar-
gued that this approach to Fourteenth Amendment interpretation is a mistake and is in-
consistent with the Amendment's underlying purposes. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 57-114 (1996). I won't try to adjudi-
cate this dispute here, but, rather, will take as given the process-based approach that
now prevails. Romer, I shall argue, can be defended without going beyond that ap-
proach.
46 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985); Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48
(1976).
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more searching judicial inquiry." '47 The Court eventually developed this
suggestion into a doctrine:
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to
say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say
that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the exis-
tence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.48
The settled doctrine today is that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to
be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discrimina-
tory purpose."49 This view draws its power from the fact that the idea of
equality does not entail that any specific substantive right should be guaran-
teed. John Hart Ely, the leading scholarly exponent of the theory that the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned primarily with prejudice infecting the
legislative process, explains that "unconstitutionality in the distribution of
benefits that are not themselves constitutionally required can intelligibly
inhere only in the way the distribution was arrived at."5
Intent, then, obviously plays an important role in at least one part of the
Court's equal protection doctrine-the part that deals with suspect classifica-
tions."' Ely has argued, moreover, that even the formalistic, levels-of-scruti-
ny approach that applies to suspect or quasi-suspect classifications is best
understood as "a handmaiden of motivation analysis. 52 "Racial classifica-
tions that disadvantage minorities are 'suspect' because we suspect they are
the product of racially prejudiced thinking of a sort we understand the Four-
teenth Amendment to have been centrally concerned with eradicating."53
Even if a challenger cannot prove the discriminatory intent behind a statute,
4 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
48 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
41 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
So JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
145 (1980).
" For a long time, confusion reigned as to whether motive mattered at all in deter-
mining the constitutionality of a law. The Supreme Court often has stated that legisla-
tive motive is not subject to judicial review, but it also has handed down many impor-
tant decisions that can be explained only in terms of motive. See Theodore Eisenberg,
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 106-10 (1977). Washington v. Davis may have ended this confu-
sion, at least to the extent that it conclusively declared that motivation is relevant. See
426 U.S. at 238-39.
" ELY, supra note 50, at 145.
13 Id. at 243 n.11.
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a classification that in fact was unconstitutionally motivated
will nonetheless-thanks to the indirect pressure exerted by
the suspect-classification doctrine-find itself in serious
constitutional difficulty. For an unconstitutional goal obvi-
ously cannot be invoked in a statute's defense. That means,
where the real goal was unconstitutional, that the goal that
fits the classification best will not be invocable in its de-
fense, and the classification will have to be defended in
terms of others to which it relates more tenuously.... The
"special scrutiny" that is afforded suspect classifications...
insists that the classification in issue fit the goal invoked in
its defense more closely than any alternative classification
would. There is only one goal the classification is likely to
fit that closely, however, and that is the goal the legislators
actually had in mind. If that goal cannot be invoked because
it is unconstitutional, the classification will fall. Thus, func-
tionally, special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an
essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of "flushing out"
unconstitutional motivation, one that lacks the proof prob-
lems of a more direct inquiry and into the bargain permits
courts (and complainants) to be more politic, to invalidate
(or attack) something for illicit motivation without having to
come right out and say that's what they're doing.54
Why should the judiciary think that it is authorized to police the motives
of legislative decisionmakers in this way? The best explanation is that of
Ely, whose work contributed to "a modest paradigm shift in the analysis of
constitutional suspiciousness ... from a victim perspective (who's getting
screwed, and how) to a perpetrator perspective (who made this allocation,
and with what incentives)."55 Ely is troubled by Alexander Bickel's claim
that "judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system" and that
"when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the
action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it."56 Since Bickel, many constitutional the-
orists have seen their task as reconciling unpopular judicial decisions, such
as Brown v. Board of Education, with Bickel's "counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty."
s4 ELY, supra note 50 at 146 (footnotes omitted).
5 JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 362 (1996).
56 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (2nd ed. 1986).
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Ely aspires to develop a constitutional theory in which "the selection
and accommodation of substantive values is left almost entirely to the politi-
cal process"" and judicial review is concerned solely with "what might
capaciously be designated process writ large-with ensuring broad participa-
tion in the processes and distributions of government."58 Ely's answer to
Bickel's counter-majoritarian difficulty is to assign to the judiciary only that
task with which the legislature cannot be trusted: "the task of keep[ing] the
machinery of democratic government running as it should." '59 The basis of
this concern about process is the theory of representative government, which
requires
not simply that the representative would not sever his inter-
ests from those of a majority of his constituency but also
that he would not sever a majority coalition's interests from
those of various minorities. Naturally that cannot mean that
groups that constitute minorities of the population can never
be treated less favorably than the rest, but it does preclude a
refusal to represent them, the denial to minorities of what
Professor Dworkin has called "equal concern and respect in
the design and administration of the political institutions that
govern them."'
This constraint entails a role for judicial review. Ely concludes that, in
order for legislation to be legitimate, the citizens must all "be represented in
the sense that their interests are not to be left out of account or valued nega-
tively in the lawmaking process."'" A law that is generated by a process
tainted by prejudice, in which the legislators are biased against or hold
stereotyped views of some of their constituents, is unconstitutional. It is for
legislatures, not courts, to determine whether a law is in the public interest,
but, as Paul Brest has argued,
when the decisionmaker has treated an illicit objective as
desirable-as a benefit rather than as a cost or a neutral
factor-he has not properly evaluated the "goodness" of the
decision. The argument for judicial review of motivation is
that it is the court's task to assure, to the limited extent of
forbidding the decisionmaker to weigh improper objectives,
57 ELY, supra note 50, at 87.
Id. (footnote omitted).
19 Id. at 76.
Id. at 82 (footnotes omitted).
61 Id. at 223 n.33.
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that the decisionmaker himself determines that his decision is
good.62
B. Philosophical Underpinnings
Ely's commitment to "equal concern and respect"63 as a basis for law-
making relies on the work of Ronald Dworkin, who has made this commit-
ment the centerpiece of his political theory. Professor Dworkin, however,
has never undertaken to demonstrate why government is obligated to en-
dorse this conception of equality.' Nonetheless, the idea has widespread
appeal. John Rawls, for example, has recently written that
the deliberative conception of democracy ... restricts the
reasons citizens may use in supporting legislation to reasons
consistent with the recognition of other citizens as equals.
Here lies the difficulty with arguments for laws supporting
discrimination .... The point is that no institutional proce-
dure without such substantive guidelines for admissible rea-
sons can cancel the maxim "garbage in, garbage out."6
The most elegant demonstration that a constitution necessarily embodies
certain substantive commitments that demand equal concern and respect for
all citizens is that developed by Walter Murphy.'
Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 128. Jane Schacter argues that Ely's pro-
cess-based theory cannot explain the result in Romer, but she takes no account of the
theory's focus on unconstitutional motive. See Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and
Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361, 395-98 (1997). Ely's theory is less pure-
ly proceduralist than Schacter implies; Ely understands that democracy implies a sub-
stantive commitment to the idea that all citizens are equally entitled to concern and
respect. For further discussion of this aspect of Ely's theory, see KOPPELMAN, supra
note 45, at 38-43.
' ELY, supra note 50, at 82.
64 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 45, at 18 n.22.
65 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 430-31 (2d ed. 1996). The relevance of this
passage to the analysis of Romer has been noted by Cass Sunstein. See Sunstein, supra
note 6, at 59.
66 Rawls's debt to Murphy is particularly clear in his discussion of the possibility
that certain constitutional amendments, though enacted through appropriate procedures,
may nonetheless be invalid because they are inconsistent with basic constitutional val-
ues. See RAWLS, supra note 65, at 238-40. Rawls acknowledges that he owes this idea
to Stephen Macedo, but does not mention that Macedo reports that he is merely restat-
ing an argument devised by Murphy. See id. at 238 n.26 (citing STEPHEN MACEDO,
LIBERAL VIRTUES 182-83 (1990)).
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Murphy observes that Constitutional democracy is a hybrid of two polit-
ical theories-constitutionalism and democracy. Constitutionalism holds that
there are some fundamental rights that cannot be violated, even with the
consent of the majority. Democratic theory holds that in order for the people
to have an obligation to obey the law, they must be in some sense its au-
thors.67
Both constitutionalism and democracy imply limits to the scope of legit-
imate decisionmaking. "When such a polity consciously, seriously, and
systematically violates its fundamental principles, it destroys its justification
for existence, and public officials lose their authority to speak as agents of
the people."6 According to constitutionalism, "[a]ny change that would
transform the polity into a political system that was totalitarian, or even so
authoritarian as not to allow a wide space for human freedom, would be
illegitimate ... ,,69 According to democratic theory, "a people could not
legitimately use democratic processes to destroy the essence of democra-
cy-the right of others, either of a current majority or minority or of a mi-
nority or majority of future generations, to meaningful participation in self-
government."'7 Both theories presuppose some notion of human worth.
That constitutionalism does so is self-evident, but democracy shares the
same commitment. "A system that denies human worth cannot claim con-
sent as the foundation of its legitimacy, for what is worthless can confer
nothing."71
Any constitutional democracy, therefore, is committed to
"acknowledg[ing] the right of each member to exist as a full human be-
ing."'72 This implies certain relevant process rights. Specifically, every citi-
zen has a right to "treatment as being equal in worth to every other person,
whether private individual or public official.""'
If Murphy is right, then so long as there are cultural tendencies that
devalue certain groups of people and so long as those tendencies are strong
67 The two theories are set out in detail in WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-53 (2d ed. 1995).
" Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once
and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 163, 178 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
69 Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted).
70 Id. at 178-79 (footnotes omitted).
7' Id. at 180.
2 Walter F. Murphy, Consent and Constitutional Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BRIAN WALSH 143 (James O'Reilly ed.,
1992).
7' Id. For another transcendental argument favoring equal consideration as a postu-
late of moral and political reasoning, emphasizing the need to be able to defend social
arrangements to all participants in the system, see AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEX-
AMINED 16-19 (1992).
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enough politically to contaminate the process of political decisionmaking,
any coherent constitution logically must include at least some rights against
discrimination. It does not necessarily follow, however, that these
antidiscrimination rights must be judicially enforceable. As Jeremy Waldron
has observed, moral realism does not entail the legitimacy of judicial review
unless it can be shown that judges have greater expertise in moral matters
than do legislatures.74 Nonetheless the decision to embody this kind of
antidiscrimination right in the Fourteenth Amendment did entail a commit-
ment to federal oversight of state decisions, and it is easy to see why it
should.
The Equal Protection Clause reflects an unmistakable deter-
mination that state legislatures are not to be trusted to refrain
from engaging in racial discrimination. The drafters of that
provision were clear in their intention to establish some
means to police state action to ensure that it is not discrimi-
natory. State political processes were not to have the last
word on the question whether they were discriminating on
the basis of race.75
The basis of judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment is not that
federal judges possess any special expertise, but rather, that the legislatures
are unable to judge themselves impartially.
C. The Equal Protection Doctrine at Work
In practice, the Equal Protection doctrine of unconstitutional motive has
given legislatures a great deal of freedom. As noted earlier, motive is often
not at issue in Fourteenth Amendment litigation. "A racial classification,
regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be
upheld only upon an extraordinary justification."76 In cases in which there
is no suspect classification, the Court has constructed a doctrine that makes
it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent. Success-
ful challenges to state action under the Equal Protection Clause hardly ever
depend on a direct showing of invidious intent. Most often, the challenger
See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW
THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 158, 180-82 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
5 David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 985 (1989); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
76 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). It should be noted, howev-
er, that this statement is immediately preceded by the following: "Certain classifica-
tions ... in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm." Id
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points to objective facts from which bad intent is inferred. Romer is unusual
only in that the Court plainly indicated that it relied upon an inference of
bad intent.
Absent a suspect classification, Ely thought, "it will be next to impossi-
ble for a court responsibly to conclude that a decision was affected by an
unconstitutional motivation whenever it is possible to articulate a plausible
legitimate explanation for the action taken."' This is because, inasmuch as
laws are never enacted with only one motive, "courts will be unable to
determine-as between a rational and otherwise legitimate explanation for a
choice and an unconstitutional explanation-which one in fact motivated the
choice.""8 Ely resists the conclusion, occasionally endorsed by a court that
wavered on the question, that this difficulty renders motive irrelevant. Rath-
er, "proof of unconstitutional motivation, on those occasions where it is
relevant at all, properly functions simply to trigger the ordinary demand for
a legitimate defense."79
Ely's view has been borne out in the Supreme Court's decisions. Daniel
Ortiz has shown that the Court's approach to government decisions that
have a disparate impact on minorities, at least with respect to housing and
public employment, amounts in practice to minimal scrutiny. "Instead of
asking whether the decisionmaker would have made the same decision with-
out the discriminatory motivation, the Court asks something a bit closer to
whether it could have done so."80 This approach fails to satisfy the require-
ments of Ely's process theory because "the presence of permissible
goals---even very substantial ones-supporting a decision simply does not
reveal how important the impermissible goals were."8 ' With this approach,
"impermissible motivation might have changed the ultimate result of the
decisionmaking process and yet still be excused.""
ELY, supra note 50, at 138.
78 John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1278 (1970).
79 Id.
'o Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105,
1115 (1989). Thus, in Washington v. Davis, the Court found the employment test was
"neutral on its face and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the government is
constitutionally empowered to pursue." 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (emphases added). In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), the exclusion of blacks by the village's refusal to rezone for low-income hous-
ing was described as "essentially an unavoidable consequence of a legislative policy
that has in itself always been deemed to be legitimate." Id. at 279 n. 25 (emphasis
added). Ortiz observes that the emphasized words in both of the above quotations "reso-
nate with the language of reduced scrutiny." Ortiz, supra, at 1115.
"1 Ortiz, supra note 80, at 1116.
82 Id.
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Moreover, the Court has interpreted the concept of impermissible intent
in a remarkably deferential way by holding that a state action does not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment unless the action was taken "'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."83 It
should not be surprising that courts applying this standard have almost never
found state action to be unconstitutional.' David Strauss observes that by
limiting unconstitutional intent to deliberate malice, the Court has held "that
the government is free to undervalue the interests of a class of citizens, to
treat them with indifference, to ignore the burdens it imposes on them, so
long as it does so in order to achieve an objective other than injuring the
group.""5 If this is the standard for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, then
even the deliberate segregation invalidated in Brown v. Board of Education
is probably constitutional because "it is not obvious that the architects of
Jim Crow invariably desired to hurt blacks."'
Strauss argues that the reason the Court adopted the discriminatory
intent standard was to contain the disruptive implications of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Alternative conceptions of discrimination, focusing on such
results of decisionmaking as subordination, stigma, second-class citizenship,
or encouragement of prejudice, were unacceptable to the Court because
"they seemed far more vague than the discriminatory intent standard, and
they seemed far more threatening to established institutions."87 The Court's
cautious rationale for adopting the intent test may explain why it has applied
the test in such a halfhearted way. Strauss argues convincingly that the
intent test, "rigorously applied, .. . is no less threatening to established
institutions" than are the alternatives.' The problem with the intent test,
according to this account, is not that the underlying constitutional theories
focus on motive rather than result, but that the Court has biased the test
8 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
8' In addition to the Supreme Court cases cited above, in which no plaintiff ever
prevailed, see, for example, Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1319 (5th
Cir. 1991); Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243, 1268 (5th Cir. 1981);
Mihalcik v. Lensink, 732 F.Supp. 299, 302 (D. Conn. 1990); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F.
Supp. 926, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1001-1006 (D.
Mass. 1979); Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 254-57 (M.D. Fla. 1979), aft'd,
644 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1981) (each citing and following Feeney).
85 Strauss, supra note 75, at 963.
86 Id. at 964.
Some of them may have sincerely desired only to promote social stability and the
harmonious development of both races. Some may have sincerely believed that
segregation aided blacks. Or they may have recognized its harmful effects but
considered them a regrettable byproduct of a system that was best for society as a
whole.
Id. (footnote omitted).
87 Id. at 939.
88 Id.
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against the party challenging the law. A surgical technique is not discredited
by a low success rate if it becomes clear that the surgeons were trying to
kill their patients.89
There is, however, an alternative explanation for why the Court has not
pursued the intent test with any zeal. Intent-based analysis is costly. As
already noted, invidious intent must always be difficult to prove. Moreover,
as Kenneth Karst argued soon after the Court adopted the intent test, be-
cause judges are reluctant to impugn the motives of other officials, such a
doctrine inevitably will tend to validate official decisions.9" Finally, as
Strauss observes, a serious application of the intent test necessarily leads to
speculative or meaningless questions. A court must ask, "suppose the ad-
verse effects of the challenged government decision fell on whites instead of
blacks, or on men instead of women. Would the decision have been differ-
ent?"" But this means that we must ask, for example, whether abortion
would be outlawed if men could get pregnant. Such a question is unanswer-
able. Thus, any test that directly seeks to find unconstitutional intent is
bound to fail. Like the sun, the thing can only be looked at indirectly.
There is, however, one other way of invalidating legislation that does
not contain a suspect classification. This requires that one look to the objec-
tive purpose of the statute-the purpose that plainly appears from an exami-
nation of the face of the statute. Thus, at the same time that Justice Scalia
has argued that "discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the
statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task," he has written
that "it is possible to discern the objective 'purpose' of a statute (i.e., the
public good at which its provisions appear to be directed)."92
" I have offered a similar criticism of the Court's equal protection doctrine in
KOPPELMAN, supra note 45, at 103-11.
90
[T]he ultimate issue will be posed in terms of the goodness or the evil of the
officials' hearts. Courts have long regarded such inquiries as unseemly, as the
legislative investigation cases of the 1950's attest. The principal concern here is
not that tender judicial sensibilities may be bruised, but that a judge's reluctance
to challenge the purity of other officials' motives may cause her to fail to recog-
nize valid claims of racial discrimination even when the motives for governmental
action are highly suspect. Because an individual's behavior results from the inter-
action of a multitude of motives, and because racial attitudes often operate at the
margin of consciousness, in any given case there almost certainly will be an op-
portunity for a government official to argue that his action was prompted by
racially neutral considerations. When that argument is made, should we not expect
the judge to give the official the benefit of the moral doubt? When the govern-
mental action is the product of a group decision, will not that tendency toward
generosity be heightened?
Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163,
1164-65 (1978) (footnote omitted).
9' Strauss, supra note 75, at 957.
' Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
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This method of sticking to the facial purpose of the statute is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with the process-based approach to the Equal Protection
Clause. If directly searching for the legislature's subjective purpose is really
a forlorn and doomed enterprise, then one needs proxies that have evidentia-
ry value. One such proxy is the objective purpose of the statute. It provides
clear evidence of the subjective goals of the lawmakers.
The Court recently followed this objective approach in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,93 in which it struck down four
ordinances that a city had enacted with the avowed purpose of preventing a
Santeria church from practicing animal sacrifice. The laws, the Court held,
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because their
object was to suppress a religious practice. Justice Kennedy, who wrote the
majority opinion, was able to find lurid statements by Hialeah city officials
indicating that they sought "not to permit this Church to exist" and thought
that Santeria was "an abomination to the Lord" and the worship of "de-
mons."'94 But Justice Kennedy lost his majority in the section of the opin-
ion that cited these facts; only Justice Stevens joined it. The majority por-
tion of the opinion held that "suppression of the central element of the
Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances,"95 and cited the
language and operation of the statutes, as well as the fact that almost all
nonreligious killings of animals were expressly exempted.
The objective approach does not confine the Court's attention to the four
comers of the statute. The context in which the law was enacted is another
objective fact that the Court may properly take into account in discerning
the law's purpose. This is always so when the suspect classification doctrine
is used; it is only by reference to the tendencies in American culture to
stigmatize and devalue certain groups that the Court has been able to discern
the "discrete and insular minorities" that need judicial protection." Even
Frankfurter once took a similar line:
You may have observed that I have not yet used the word "intention." All these
years I have avoided speaking of the "legislative intent." . . . Legislation has an
aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a
change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not
drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statute,
as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what the
judge must seek and effectuate, and he ought not to be led off the trail by tests
that have overtones of subjective design. We are not concerned with anything
subjective. We do not delve into the minds of legislators or their draftsmen, or
committee members.
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 1947 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 538-39.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 541-42 (quoting various Hialeah city officials).
91 Id. at 534.
' For a recent study of the suspectness inquiry that highlights its irreducible cultural
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when a suspect classification does not appear on the face of the statute,
however, context is relevant. Again, Lukumi is an illustration. The imper-
missible purpose of the laws was evident from the face of three of the ordi-
nances, which prohibited "sacrifice" of animals as part of a "ritual."97 The
fourth ordinance, however, was facially neutral; Ordinance 87-72 merely
prohibited "the killing of animals for food" outside of areas zoned for
slaughterhouses. 8 It only exempted the slaughter or processing for sale of
"small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an ex-
emption provided by state law."" The Court declared the ordinance
"underinclusive on its face"'" because the exempted activities implicated
the city's professed concerns about public health and cruelty to animals as
much as animal sacrifice did. This argument alone, however, could hardly
have invalidated the law. The Court has often upheld arbitrarily
underinclusive statutes.10
If any innocent-sounding explanation will save a statute that involves no
suspect classification, then this law should have been upheld. 2 The Court
conceded that, "unlike the three other ordinances," this one "does appear to
apply to substantial nonreligious conduct and not to be overbroad."'' 3
Nonetheless, the Court held that the invidious purpose of the other three
ordinances contaminated this one as well:
For our purposes here, however, the four substantive ordi-
nances may be treated as a group for neutrality purposes.
Ordinance 87-72 was passed the same day as [one of the
others] and was enacted, as were the three others, in direct
response to the opening of the Church. It would be implausi-
dimension, see Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened
Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753 (1996).
City of Hialeah, Fl., Ordinance 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987), quoted in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 527.
98 Id. 87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987), quoted in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S.
at 528.
9' Id., quoted in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 528; see Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 555-57, for the full text.
"v' Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 545.
See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding the
exemption from a pushcart ban of any vendors of a certain longevity); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding the exemption from a ban on
advertising on vehicles of any vehicles advertising the owner's products).
102 But cf Petitioner's Brief at 27, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (No. 91-948) ("If this Court permits even [the limited protection for
free exercise that it now provides] to be evaded by clever drafting and a mere pretense
of neutrality, then it has indeed repealed the Free Exercise Clause.").
103 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 539-40.
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ble to suggest that the three other ordinances, but not Ordi-
nance 87-72, had as their object the suppression of religion.
We need not decide whether Ordinance 87-72 could survive
constitutional scrutiny if it existed separately; it must be
invalidated because it functions, with the rest of the enact-
ments in question, to suppress Santeria religious worship."
The doctrine of impermissible intent that the Court has constructed tends
to ignore the subjective intentions of the lawmakers, but encourages inquiry
into the objective purpose of the law. Moreover, the inquiry into this pur-
pose can be facilitated by knowledge of the context in which the law was
enacted-once again, an objective inquiry. The pursuit of illicit motivation
has produced a procedure that, for sound institutional reasons, drives evi-
dence of actual motive to the margins of judicial inquiry."
The case for this approach becomes strongest when one considers laws
enacted by referendum, such as Amendment 2. Such laws are subject to the
same equal protection scrutiny as any other laws. "The sovereignty of the
people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which have been
duly adopted and remain unrepealed." 1 The problems of discerning the
subjective intent of lawmakers obviously become insuperable when one
confronts a lawmaking body composed of hundreds of thousands, or even
millions, of voters."
4 ld. at 540; cf. id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (stating that the Court should invalidate "those laws which, though neutral in
their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a
particular religion for discriminatory treatment").
Lino Graglia's critique of Lukumi misses this possibility and faults the Court for
leaving uncertain "whether Ordinance 87-72 was found invalid because of its 'object,'
i.e. improper legislative intent, or because of its 'function,' i.e., its effect on Santeria
practice." Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal Sacrifice and
Religious Persecution, 85 GEo. L.J. 1, 42 (1996). The answer is the former, but the in-
tent that matters is not to be found in the legislative history. Thus, it is unsurprising that
Graglia finds Justice Scalia's concurrence incomprehensible. See id. at 49-51.
106 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
107 Amendment 2 is an illustration. 813,966 people voted for the Amendment, while
710,151 voted against it. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993). Jane
Schacter has observed that "courts simply could not cumulate what may be millions of
voter intentions." Jane Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilem-
mas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 125 (1995). Julian Eule, recognizing the
"inevitable evidentiary obstacles to assessing electoral motivation," thinks that only
"[t]wo approaches are possible. We may relax the burden of proving discriminatory
purpose and be more imaginative about the sources we canvass-for example, ballot
pamphlets, exit polls, campaign advertising-or we may abandon the purpose require-
ment altogether in certain plebiscitary settings." Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of
Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1562 (1990). This is the same false dichotomy
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The Court has struck down, on the basis of invidious purpose, three
laws enacted by popular vote. In Reitman v. Mulkey," the Court invali-
dated an amendment to the California constitution that prohibited the state
from interfering with "the right of any person ... to decline to sell, lease,
or rent [real] property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute dis-
cretion, chooses."'" The Court reasoned that the amendment, though fa-
cially neutral, "was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrim-
ination in the housing market.""' Hunter v. Erickson"' involved an
amendment to the Akron, Ohio city charter that required that any ordinance
regulating real estate transactions "on the basis of race, color, religion, na-
tional origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority ' of the
voters. The Court held the amendment unconstitutional because it made "an
explicitly racial classification treating racial housing matters differently from
other racial and housing matters."". Finally, in Washington v. Seattle
School District No. I,4 the Court relied on Hunter to invalidate an
amendment prohibiting mandatory school busing, holding that although
the political majority may generally restructure the political
process to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to
secure the benefits of governmental action ... a different
analysis is required when the State allocates governmental
power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a
decision to determine the decisionmaking process."'
None of these cases gathers evidence of motive in fact. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has observed that "neither the Supreme Court nor this
Court has ever inquired into the motivation of voters in an equal protection
we noted earlier in Lino Graglia's critique of Lukumi. See supra note 105. The pursuit
of a law's objective purpose does not require reliance on such extrinsic aids as media
sources, which in any case cannot yield any determinate popular intent. See Schacter,
supra, at 144-47. When a plebiscite is challenged, only objective evidence of invidious
intent is likely to be available to a court. See Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal
Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 527, 567-72 (1994).
108 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
109 Id. at 371 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2b (repealed 1974)).
11o Id. at 381.
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
2 d. at 387 (quoting amended city charter).
113 id. at 389.
114 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
115 Id. at 470.
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clause challenge to a referendum election involving a facially neutral refer-
endum unless racial discrimination was the only possible motivation behind
the referendum results."' 16
In a discussion written before Washington, Ely argues that Reitman was
wrongly decided because the statute in question was facially neutral but that
the Hunter amendment was different: "[B]ecause it [was] directed in terms
at legislation respecting racial and religious groups, it plainly was enacted
with the motivation of rendering unusually difficult the efforts of such
groups to secure protection via the political process.""' 7 Hunter, therefore,
is an easy case; the others are harder. But one cannot easily dismiss, even if
one can question, Reitman and Washington."' In context, each decision is
as obviously about discrimination against blacks and the remedies for such
discrimination as if the statutes had said so. In neither case can the impact
on blacks be said to be an accidental by-product of the law. There was
enough evidence of racial motivation to warrant some degree of suspicion.
Once suspicion is aroused, the presumptions that are put into play may
appropriately-indeed, must-do the rest of the work. The Sixth Circuit has
gone so far as to hold that "in the referendum context, it is impermissible
for the reviewing court to inquire into the possible actual motivations of the
electorate in adopting the proposal."".9
116 Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 5 73 (6th Cir. 1986).
1 Ely, supra note 78, at 1301; cf Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring)
("Here, we have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for
certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their interest.").
11 The weaknesses, as precedent or persuasive authority, of this line of cases are
noted in Seidman, supra note 9, at 75.
19 Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 270 n.9 (6th Cir. 1995), va-
cated and remanded on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996), reaffirmed on remand,
1997 WL 656228 (6th Cir. 1997); see Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 815
(6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1960 (1995); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782
F.2d 565, 573-74 (6th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit has taken a different view, though
its precise contours are unclear. After holding that an individual voter may not be sub-
jected to judicial examination concerning how or why he voted, the court stated, in
response to a petition for rehearing, that "our decision is not to be misunderstood as
holding or suggesting that, in a proper case, the motivation of the electorate may not be
examined by the introduction of either direct or circumstantial evidence. The latter
inquiry may be a proper inquiry." Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 661-62
(5th Cir. 1982). "The court, however, did not reexamine the evidence of discriminatory
voter motivation under this new standard or specify what would be a 'proper case.'
Frank R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning
the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 741 n.129 (1983).
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III. THE INTENT TEST IN ROMER
Let us at last return to the problem posed by Romer. Now that we un-
derstand why the Court is concerned about purpose, what shall we say about
its inference that an impermissible purpose underlay Amendment 2?
A. The Innocent Explanation
The difficulty that Justice Scalia raises is that an innocent explanation
for Amendment 2 seems to be available. Let us examine this innocent expla-
nation in greater detail.
The application of antidiscrimination law to nongovernmental activities
typically is predicated on the factual premise that the groups it seeks to
protect are subject to pervasive discrimination. 2 ° Opponents of
antidiscrimination protection for gays claim that whatever discrimination
gays suffer is too rare to have much impact on their lives or opportuni-
ties.' Some also think, without making any claim one way or the other
about the pervasiveness of discrimination, that laws protecting gays from
discrimination are so rarely invoked that they are not worth having."
Moreover, even if nearly every employer and landlord is predisposed to
discriminate against gays, it remains possible to avoid such discrimination.
The price of doing so is the closet. Absent a massively intrusive investiga-
tory apparatus, 2 3 it is impossible for anyone to discriminate solely on the
' Thus, for example, the argument between Richard Epstein, who advocates the
abolition of all employment discrimination laws, and his critics focuses on a factual
dispute over whether discrimination against blacks is sufficiently pervasive to withstand
the egalitarian tendencies of a well-functioning free market. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
(1992); Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual Liberties in Discriminatory Markets, 70 TEx.
L. REV. 1219 (1992) (reviewing FORBIDDEN GROUNDS); Symposium, A Critique of
Epstein's Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1994) (critiquing FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS). Even those of us who are unpersuaded by Epstein's claims about racism are
indebted to his analysis because the task of responding to him has starkly revealed what
kind of showing is necessary to make out a prima facie case for intervention in an
allegedly discriminatory market.
"2 See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 401-
11(1994).
122 See ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 157 (1995).
123 Such an apparatus has been and continues to be deployed within the United States
military, which routinely engages 'in illegal wiretaps and searches, days-long interroga-
tions, denial of access to counsel, groundless threats of severe penalties for noncoopera-
tion, incessant demands for names of other gays, coerced or forged confessions, and
intimidation of witnesses. See generally Samuel A. Marcosson, A Price Too High:
Enforcing the Ban on Gays and Lesbians in the Military and the Inevitability of Intru-
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basis of orientation because it easily is concealed. The Catholic Church's
Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith puts this point well:
An individual's sexual orientation is generally not known to
others unless he publicly identifies himself as having this
orientation or unless some overt behavior manifests it. As a
rule, the majority of homosexually oriented persons who
seek to lead chaste lives do not publicize their sexual orien-
tation. Hence the problem of discrimination in terms of em-
ployment, housing, etc., does not usually arise."2
In short, even if pervasive discrimination against all gays would be unjusti-
fied, this does not mean that one cannot justify the lower levels and more
targeted kinds of discrimination that, in fact, exist.
Moreover, if the Court really is confining itself to minimal scrutiny, then
it should not matter if gays are pervasively discriminated against, whether
by the state or by private entities. Such pervasive discrimination might
merely reflect a moral perspective that, the Court held in Hardwick, is a
permissible basis for criminal prohibition (which is a far heavier imposition
than private discrimination): the "belief ... that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable."'", A state might reasonably conclude that, if
gays by their conduct are revealing themselves to be moral monsters, they
ought not to complain when other citizens shun them as such.
Justice Kennedy declared that "[i]t is not within our constitutional tradi-
tion to enact laws of this sort,"" but the truth is that, not too long ago,
pervasive discrimination against gays was regarded as a sort of moral imper-
ative. In 1953, President Eisenhower issued an executive order barring ho-
mosexuals from all federal jobs, and the FBI initiated a "widespread system
of surveillance to keep homosexuals off the federal payroll."'27 Corpora-
tions under government contract applied the administration's security provi-
sions to their own employees, and many states and municipalities followed
the federal government's lead, while also enforcing similar standards in the
licensing of many professions." One study in the mid-1950s estimated
siveness, 64 UMKC L. REV. 59, 75-78 (1995). These practices, however, are so anoma-
lous in American society that spokespersons for the military have found it necessary to
deny that they exist. See Andrew Koppelman, Gaze in the Military: A Response to
Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC.L. REV. 179, 186 n.41 (1995).
" Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to Bishops on the Pastoral Care
of Homosexual Persons (Oct. 1, 1985), 32 POPE SPEAKS 62 (1987).
125 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
126 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
'27 JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 293 (1988).
"2' See id.
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that over 12.6 million workers, more than twenty percent of the labor force,
faced loyalty-security investigations as a condition of employment.'29
The closest thing to a canonical rationale for this pervasive discrimina-
tion was set forth in 1950 by a Senate committee that investigated the em-
ployment of "homosexuals and other moral perverts" in government. 3 °
Homosexuals, the Committee concluded, lacked "emotional stability" be-
cause "indulgence in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber of an
individual to a degree that he is not suitable for a position of responsibili-
ty.' 13' Even one "sex pervert in a Government agency," the committee
warned,
tends to have a corrosive influence upon his fellow employ-
ees. These perverts will frequently attempt to entice normal
individuals to engage in perverted practices. This is particu-
larly true in the case of young and impressionable people
who might come under the influence of a pervert .... One
homosexual can pollute a Government office.13 1
It is now clear that the committee was in the grip of a fantastic delusion.
No one believes this sort of stuff any more.' Under minimal scrutiny,
however, this ought not to matter. "[I]t has long been settled that a classifi-
cation, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it."'' "This remarkable deference to
state objectives," Tribe observes,
129 See id.; JOHN D'EMILIO, The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in
Cold War America, in MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND
THE UNIVERSITY 57-73 (1992). For the most thorough study to date of the legal status
of gays in the decade and a half after World War II, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (forthcoming 1998) (manu-
script at ch.2, on file with author).
130 COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, EMPLOYMENT OF




133 The extent to which the cultural ground has shifted can be measured by present
presidential policies and politics. After Bill Clinton became president, he issued an
executive order banning discrimination against gay civilian federal workers. More sur-
prisingly, in the waning days of the 1996 presidential campaign, the senior policy advi-
sor to Republican candidate Robert Dole declared that a Dole administration would
maintain that policy. See Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Dole Aid Meets with Log Cabin Candidate
to Keep Non-Bias Policy, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 1, 1996, at 1. The advisor, Sheila Burke,
had been Dole's chief of staff until he resigned from the Senate.
134 Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
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has operated in the sphere of economic regulation quite apart
from whether the conceivable "state of facts" (1) actually
exists, (2) would convincingly justify the classification if it
did exist, or (3) was ever urged in the classification's de-
fense either by those who promulgated it or by those who ar-
gued in its support.'35
If believed, the Senate Committee's claims obviously would justify discrimi-
nation against homosexuals by a broad range of private employers as well
as by government.
Not only is it possible to doubt the need for antidiscrimination protec-
tion of gays, it is also possible reasonably to object to the expressive func-
tion of antidiscrimination ordinances such as Denver's. As Scalia observed,
such ordinances are intended by at least some of their supporters to achieve
"not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of
homosexuality."'36 Some opponents of such laws also interpret them in
just this way.
When a legislature acts to protect homosexual behavior un-
der antidiscrimination laws, it elevates homosexual practices
to the status of protected activities while at the same time
branding many mainstream religious institutions and individ-
uals as outlaws engaged in antisocial and immoral behavior.
Symbolically, gay rights legislation declares homosexual
behavior good (i.e., protected) and religiously motivated
discrimination evil (i.e., prohibited). 37
The rationale for Amendment 2, then, might well be the following:
Homosexual conduct is intrinsically evil and corrupting; so much so that it
justifies discrimination in almost every context. In fact, however, such dis-
crimination rarely occurs, and, when it does occur, it does little harm.
Antidiscrimination law, then, does not protect gays in any tangible way. Its
sole function is the expressive one of giving gays a legitimacy they do not
deserve and giving moral scruples against homosexual conduct a stigma that
they do not deserve." For these reasons, one might argue, the Colorado
135 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1443 (2d ed. 1988).
136 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1634 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 Duncan, supra note 121, at 397-98.
138 One can accept the description of the Amendment 2 controversy as an episode in
the culture wars without claiming, as some have, that it was gays who started the fight
by seeking antidiscrimination legislation. As the above description of the 1950s regime
makes clear, the culture wars over homosexuality have been going on for a long time.
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electorate was entirely justified in seizing from gays the expressive machin-
ery of the state and deploying it on its own behalf.'39
There is no question that many of the supporters of Amendment 2 had
motives of this kind. Such motives do not per se deny anyone equal concern
and respect. Professor Dworkin argues that, in the context of Amendment 2,
"there can be no difference" between moral disapproval and animus.'4 °
This is because Dworkin thinks that Romer implicitly denies (what he ex-
plicitly denies) that it is legitimate "for a state to impose a disadvantage on
a particular group just to express the majority's moral contempt for that
group's practices, even when no other proper purpose, such as protecting
anyone's economic or security interests, is served." 4' In so claiming, Pro-
fessor Dworkin relies on an argument that he has often made-that govern-
ment fails to treat citizens with equal concern and respect whenever it re-
stricts individual liberty on the ground that one citizen's conception of the
good life is better than another's. 4 1 John Finnis adequately answered this
claim long ago. Morals legislation
may manifest, not contempt, but a sense of the equal worth
and human dignity of those people whose conduct is out-
lawed precisely on the ground that it expresses a serious
misconception of, and actually degrades, human worth and
dignity, and thus degrades their own personal worth and
dignity, along with that of others who may be induced to
share in or emulate their degradation.' 43
The gay rights activists merely seized, and sought to turn around, cultural artillery that
previously had been firing at them.
' For other accounts of the rationality of Amendment 2, see Tymkovich et al.,
supra note 4, passim, Seidman, supra note 9, at 101-02, and Duncan, supra note 16, at
354-55.
,4' Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 8,
1996, at 44, 49.
141 Id.
For Colorado could certainly declare, in good faith, that the amendment's 'sheer
breadth' was justified by the depth of its citizens' moral disapproval of homosex-
uality. Nothing less than a complete ban on any law that suggests that homosexu-
ality is an acceptable form of sexual union, it might say, would be enough to
express the profoundness of the majority's rejection of that moral position.
Id. at 49-50.
,41 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-77 (1977).
143 J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of 'Duties to Oneself ." Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1987); see also JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 221-23 (1980).
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It is clear that the condemnation of homosexuality by the Catholic Church,
for example, takes precisely this form. Homosexuals themselves are not
condemned. Their equal dignity and worth is emphatically insisted upon.1"
As Ely has pointed out, "a sincerely held moral objection to the act" of
homosexual sex is not per se the same thing as "a simple desire to injure
the parties involved."'45
Any attempt to justify Romer by invoking a general right to
antidiscrimination protection must fail. At one point in his opinion in
Romer, Justice Kennedy comes close to suggesting that gays have such a
substantive right.
We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2
withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need
them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society. 46
This argument seems to draw on an amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court
by Laurence Tribe and four other eminent constitutional law scholars (in-
cluding Ely). The Tribe group argued that Amendment 2 was a per se viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. According to the brief, it is unconstitu-
tional "for a state's constitution absolutely to preclude, for a selected set of
persons, even the possibility of protection under any state or local law from
a whole category of harmful conduct, including some that is undeniably
wrongful."'47 This is because "the Equal Protection Clause requires a re-
gime that gives all persons equal access at least to the possibility of pro-
tection under the laws of the state from the wrongs.that may befall
them-whether such wrongs as robbery or such wrongs as discrimination,
and whether privately or officially inflicted." 4 ' "Outlawry may be consis-
4 See infra note 263.
145 ELY, supra note 50, at 256 n.92. The two sides of this distinction are not mutually
exclusive, as Ely seems to think; a moral objection can impose norms of caste, of the
kind that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimina-
tion Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197,
277-84 (1994). On the other hand, moral objections to homosexual conduct are not all
reducible to rationalized sexism, even if some are. My critique of Ely in the article just
cited was too cavalier in its treatment of this concern.
146 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627,(1996).
147 Amicus Curiae Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip
B. Kurland & Kathleen Sullivan at 2, Romer (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae
Brief].
141 Id. at 8.
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tent with some regimes, but it is not consistent with the regime contemplat-
ed by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 49
The trouble with these formulations is that they presuppose, not only
that such exclusion is unjustified, but also that gays need legal protection in
order to avoid it. Unless an action inflicts actual harm, its wrongfulness is
no reason for the state to prohibit it. If you make a voodoo doll with my
image and stick pins in it, you may be acting with wrongful (perhaps even
homicidal) intent, but it would not be appropriate for the state to intervene
to stop you. Moreover, even if a certain kind of private action does harm
me, I may not be entitled to protection from it. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of
193250 prohibited the federal courts from issuing a restraining order or
injunction in "a case involving or growing out of'a labor dispute, '' . there-
by deliberately depriving employers of a remedy that federal courts had
previously provided. The employers were thus denied legal protection even
in cases where the federal courts held the strikes against them to be wrong-
ful, but the statute was upheld.'52 Some read Romer as adopting this un-
persuasive rationale, but this departs radically from the text of the opin-
149 Id. at 10-11.
150 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994).
151 Id. § 101.
152 See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). For a similar critique
of the Tribe brief's argument, see Jeffrey Rosen, Disoriented, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23,
1995, at 24-26.
Before Lauf, many courts did invalidate anti-injunction acts on the basis of argu-
ments such as this. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERI-
CAN LABOR MOVEMENT 151-52 (1991). The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the
Equal Protection Clause "forbids the granting of equitable relief to one man and the
denying of it to another under like circumstances and in the same territorial jurisdic-
tion." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 334 (1921). The dissenter in Lauf thought that
if Norris-LaGuardia were not narrowly construed, then it must be unconstitutional under
Truax. See Lauf, 303 U.S. at 340 (Butler, J., dissenting). The weakness of the Truax
argument was noted at the time by Justice Brandeis:
[A]n injunction has been denied on grounds of expediency in many cases where
the remedy at law is confessedly not adequate. This occurs whenever a dominant
public interest is deemed to require that the preventive remedy, otherwise avail-
able for the protection of private rights, be refused and the injured party left to
such remedy as courts of law may afford. Thus, courts ordinarily refuse, perhaps
in the interest of free speech, to restrain actionable libels. In the interest of per-
sonal liberty they ordinarily refuse to enforce specifically, by mandatory injunc-
tion or otherwise, obligations involving personal service. In the desire to preserve
the separation of governmental powers they have declined to protect by injunction
mere political rights, and have refused to interfere with the operations of the
police department.
Truax, 257 U.S. at 374-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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ion.'53 Romer speaks, not of substantive rights, but of impermissible ani-
mus.
Another way of making the innocent explanation irrelevant has been
suggested by Akhil Amar, who argues that Amendment 2 should be under-
stood as a sort of bill of attainder against a class of persons defined by
status and not by conduct. 54 Amar argues that the "analytic lynchpin" of
Romer is Justice Kennedy's claim that Amendment 2 burdens a "targeted
class" and "imposes a special disability upon [homosexuals] alone.' '55 Of
course, all laws classify, but Amendment 2 is peculiar because it is based on
153 The editors of the Harvard Law Review thus argue that the Court "founded its
decision on a rule that legislation making it more burdensome for a single group of
citizens to seek the government's protection is a per se denial of equal protection of the
laws." Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 163 (1996). For a similar claim, see William
M. Wilson III, Romer v. Evans: "Terminal Silliness," or Enlightened Jurisprudence?,
75 N.C. L. REV. 1891, 1936-37 (1997). Their interpretation rests on Justice Kennedy's
statement that Amendment 2 constituted "a denial of equal protection of the laws in the
most literal sense," Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 155 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 116
S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996)), and his statement, when he first mentions the rational rela-
tionship test, that the Amendment's difficulties under that test are "in addition to the
far-reaching deficiencies of Amendment 2 that we have noted." Leading Cases, supra
note 11, at 160 (quoting Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629) (emphasis added by Harvard). The
Harvard writers argue that
[b]ecause the final portion of the opinion invokes the rational basis test, it is
tempting to conclude that the opinion rests solely upon it and to avoid recognizing
that the per se rule forms the basis of an independent argument. The per se analy-
sis alone would have been sufficient to invalidate the Amendment, however, and
the rational basis argument in a sense operated as, at most, an alternative holding.
Id. at 160-61.
This argument is an overreading of Kennedy's opinion, which nowhere speaks of a
per se denial of equal protection, and it generates law that is hard to defend. The Har-
vard writers claim that "a state violation of the Court's per se rule is unjustifiable under
any circumstances," id. at 160, but Cass Sunstein observes that if a state said "that no
governmental body may allow cigarette smokers to claim minority status, quota prefer-
ences, or protected status for any claim of discrimination, it would probably be acting
constitutionally." Sunstein, supra note 6, at 58. Why would one want to argue the oppo-
site? But see Duncan, supra note 121. The Harvard editors' reading also minimizes
Kennedy's statement that the rational basis objection to the law is "related" to the sin-
gling out of the group. See Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 160. It does not explain
what the relationship is. I would suggest that the two points are related inasmuch as
they are two steps in a single equal protection analysis. Cf Schacter, supra note 62, at
380 ("Whether independent or interdependent, it seems fair to conclude that the quali-
ties that make Amendment 2 violate the literal terms of the Equal Protection
Clause-the unalloyed attempt to deny gay people ordinary access to antidiscrimination
remedies-undermined the law's rationality and thus supported the animus finding.").
154 See Akhil Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 203 (1996).
"' Id. at 225 (quoting Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626-27).
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a trait-sexual orientation-rather than on conduct. Like a bill of attainder,
Amendment 2 penalizes gays simply for being who they are. "[M]ere orien-
tation cannot be criminalized or used by law to disenfranchise or de-
grade, 156 but this is what Amendment 2 did. 5' Amar thus concludes that
the Amendment "is formally flawed in a way that should be clear even to
the most finicky formalist. It is flawed on its face-in its words, not just in
their spirit."'58
Amar's account leaves crucially ambiguous whether the formal singling
out of gays for disfavored treatment was itself the constitutional violation, or
whether the singling out was merely evidence of a violation.'59 To the ex-
tent that he suggests that the former is the case, Amar mistakes a step in
Justice Kennedy's argument for its conclusion. If it were unconstitutional to
single out a named class for disadvantage, then, as Justice Scalia pointed
out, it would also be impermissible to enact a "state law prohibiting the
award of municipal contracts to relatives of mayors or city councilmen."' "w
Amar responds that such a law would not target anyone in particular; it
"could apply to many persons in the future if their relatives happen to win
office.'' 6. It is equally true, however, that at the time such a law is enact-
ed, some people will be affected immediately, and everyone is likely to
know who at least some of them are. Even if the legislative history makes it
plain that the statute was enacted solely in response to one city's too-cozy
dealings with the mayor's brother, the law is valid because its purpose is
legitimate. Amar's account of Romer focuses on the fact that the Amend-
ment named a disfavored class, but this naming mattered to the Court only
because of what it revealed about the Amendment's purpose.'62 If singling
156 Id. at 228.
' The Amar theory states an alternative reading of the Tribe amicus brief, described
above. See infra text accompanying notes 158-61. One way of reading Tribe's brief is
that it is impermissible to "single out particular persons," Amicus Curiae Brief, supra
note 147, at 5, to withhold from a named, "selected and specified" class of citizens, id.
at 13, a benefit that everyone else is entitled to. Here, the special defect of Amendment
2 is its language "[r]endering some persons facially ineligible for the protection of the
state's laws from a certain type of wrong." Id. at 8.
158 Amar, supra note 154, at 230.
15' Amar's article nowhere denies the importance of purpose, and in several places
emphasizes its relevance. See id. at 214 & n.36, 226, 233-34. If purpose matters, how-
ever, then the trouble with Amendment 2 is not a purely formal one, as Amar suggests
elsewhere. See id. at 230.
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 Amar, supra note 154, at 233.
162 Look again at the conclusion of the Court's chain of reasoning. The broad disabil-
ity imposed on a targeted group
raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosi-
ty toward the class of persons affected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of
'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that
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out a named class for disadvantage were sufficient to render a law unconsti-
tutional, then there would have been no need to survey the state's proffered
justifications to determine whether any of them was a persuasive justifica-
tion for the law. The Court's focus on motive reflects Ely's insight that
"unconstitutionality in the distribution of benefits that are not themselves
constitutionally required can intelligibly inhere only in the way the distribu-
tion was arrived at.' 163
B. Does the Innocent Explanation Save Amendment 2?
If it is possible to imagine an innocent explanation for a law, is the
game over? Must we conclude that Romer is wrongly decided? The trouble
with this kind of reasoning is that it proves far too much. There always have
been innocent explanations for discriminatory laws, even those animated by
the most sinister of motives. The Court, however, strikes down some laws,
even those that can be given innocent explanations, when objective indicia
of invidious intent dispose the Court toward suspicion."
The question, then, is whether Justice Scalia's benign interpretation is
persuasive, given the context in which Amendment 2 was adopted. Chief
Justice Warren raised the same problem of innocent explanations when he
a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legiti-
mate governmental interest."
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)). Moreno did not involve the naming of a class defined by status. It invalidated a
1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act that excluded from participation in the food
stamp program any member of a household whose members were not all related to each
other. (Congress evidently was attempting to prevent "hippie communes" from receiving
any stamps). See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529. Moreno involved, not status, but Congres-
sional targeting of households of a kind it disapproved of. Membership in a certain kind
of household is not a trait or an orientation, and the food stamp amendment was not
purely a "status-based enactment." The case for an inference of status-based animus is
stronger in Romer than it was in Moreno, but it is not clear that it can be persuasive
even in Romer. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder?
Some Questions About Professor Amar's Analysis of Romer, 95 MICH. L. REV. 236
(1996); Halley, supra note 14, at 443-44. I have criticized elsewhere the frequently
repeated claim that homosexuality must be an immutable status in order to be entitled to
constitutional protection. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND
SOCIAL EQUALITY 146-48 (1996); Andrew Koppelman, Three Arguments for Gay
Rights, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1636, 1652-61 (1997).
163 ELY, supra note 50, at 151. Once more, it can be argued that first-class citizen-
ship and nonsubordination are benefits that are themselves constitutionally required, see
supra note 66, but this is not the line that the Court has taken.
" This is why Professor Duncan's discussion of marriage, which attempts to provide
a rational basis for state refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples, cannot
resolve the constitutional debate over that issue. See Duncan, supra note 121.
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wrote in Brown v. Board of Education that "[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal."'16 The statement was correct insofar as it recog-
nized the implausibility of the "separate but equal" claim in the context of
Jim Crow, but it was incredible insofar as it was phrased in terms of what
Charles Black called "the metaphysics of sociology: 'Must Segregation
Amount to Discrimination?""'  Charles Black's comment remains instruc-
tive:
That is an interesting question; someday the methods of
sociology may be adequate to answering it. But it is not our
question. Our question is whether discrimination inheres in
that segregation which is imposed by law in the twentieth
century in certain specific states in the American Union. And
that question has meaning and can find an answer only on
the ground of history and of common knowledge about the
facts of life in the times and places aforesaid. 67
Just as Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown seemed to invite an
irrelevant debate about the metaphysics of sociology, Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Romer seems to invite an irrelevant debate about the metaphysics
of legislative draftsmanship: a debate about how narrow a class may permis-
sibly be disadvantaged by a statute, how broad the disadvantaging may be,
and how the narrowness and broadness should be calibrated in order to
avoid unconstitutionality. This would be a silly direction for constitutional
law to go in. In both cases, the issue is what the purpose of the law is in the
context in which it was enacted. This question "has meaning and can find
an answer only on the ground of history and of common knowledge about
the facts of life in the times and places aforesaid."'" To say it again, con-
text matters.
Up to this point, we have uncovered a gap in the Court's reasoning in
Romer. The fact that a group, narrowly defined, is saddled with a broad
range of disabilities does not, without more, warrant an inference of imper-
missible motive. If this gap cannot be filled, then Romer is decided wrong-
ly. 69 Conversely, if Romer is rightly decided, and if the opinion accurately
165 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).




169 Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry attempt to leap over the gap by arguing that
Romer stands for a narrowly confined "pariah principle," which "forbids the govern-
ment from designating any social group as untouchable." Farber & Sherry, supra note
7, at 258. They claim that Romer implies nothing about heightened scrutiny of laws that
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represents at least a part of the sequence of reasoning that leads to that
conclusion, then we must be able to point to facts that complete the logical
circuit.
C. Invidious Motives
Given its context in American culture, is there any good reason to think
that a law like Amendment 2, which on its face imposes unusual disadvan-
tages on gays, is the product of impermissible motives? What does history
and common knowledge tell us about the way in'which gays are regarded in
the contemporary United States?
1. Hatred
First of all, raw hatred of gays has been and continues to be quite com-
mon. In the most extreme cases, it takes the form of random attacks on
strangers. "Violence against gay men and lesbians," Kendall Thomas ob-
serves, "on the streets, in the workplace, at home-is a structural feature of
life in American society."'70 In a survey of anti-gay violence and harass-
ment in eight major cities,
discriminate against gays because unlike conventional equal protection doctrine, which
"looks to the target group's general status in society," the pariah principle "looks only
to the particular legislation at issue to determine whether it creates or encourages pariah
status." Id. at 274. This argument reproduces the same logical gap we saw in Romer
while demonstrating its unpersuasiveness even more dramatically. Status is social; it
cannot be discerned from the four corners of a statute. How can one possibly determine
whether a particular legislation "creates or encourages pariah status" unless one reads it
in light of its cultural context, most relevantly "the target group's general status in soci-
ety"? In arguing that the pariah principle applies to Amendment 2, Farber and Sherry
betray their promise not to look beyond the legislation itself; they are compelled repeat-
edly to advert to the meaning of the social stigmatization of homosexuality, and in
particular to the fact that "[h]omosexuals are hated not just for what they do but for
who they are." Id. at 279. The general cultural inquiry into the indicia of suspectness
cannot thus neatly be cabined off. For a similar critique of Farber and Sherry, see J.M.
Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2357-58 (1997).
170 Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1464
(1992). It is also a venerable tradition.
Gay men and lesbians in America have been "condemned to death by choking,
burning and drowning; ... executed, [castrated], jailed, pilloried, fined, court-
martialed, prostituted, fired, framed, blackmailed, disinherited, [lobotomized,
shock-treated, psychoanalyzed and] declared insane, driven to insanity, to suicide,
murder, and self-hate, witch-hunted, entrapped, stereotyped, mocked, insulted,
isolated .. .castigated .. .despised [and degraded]."
Id. at 1462 (quoting JOHNATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY
MEN IN THE U.S.A. 11, 22-23, 44, 127-28 (1976)).
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86.2% of the gay men and women surveyed stated that they
had been attacked verbally; 44.2% reported that they had
been threatened with violence; 27.3% had had objects thrown
at them; 34.9% had been chased or followed; 13.9% had
been spit at; 19.2% had been punched, hit, kicked, or beaten;
9.3% had been assaulted with a weapon; 18.5% had been the
victims of property vandalism or arson; 30.9% reported
sexual harassment, many by members of their own families
or by the police.''
A study commissioned by the National Institute of Justice, the research arm
of the U.S. Department of Justice, found that gays "are probably the most
frequent victims [of hate violence today]."'72 As a consequence, "gay men
and lesbians always and everywhere have to live their lives on guard, know-
ing that they are vulnerable to attack at any time.""'
Attacks on gays bespeak an astonishing rage, frequently involving tor-
ture and mutilation. Homophobic murders typically involve mutilation of the
victim. The coordinator of one hospital's victim assistance program reported
that "attacks against gay men were the most heinous and brutal I encoun-
tered."' 74 A physician reported that injuries suffered by the victims of ho-
mophobic violence that he had treated were so "vicious" as to make clear
that "the intent is to kill and maim" 75:
Weapons include knives, guns, brass knuckles, tire irons,
baseball bats, broken bottles, metal chains, and metal pipes.
Injuries include severe lacerations requiring extensive plastic
surgery; head injuries, at times requiring surgery; puncture
wounds of the chest, requiring insertion of chest tubes; re-
moval of the spleen for traumatic rupture; multiple fractures
of the extremities, jaws, ribs, and facial bones; severe eye
injuries, in two cases resulting in permanent loss of vision;
as well as severe psychological trauma the level of which
would be difficult to measure.'76
171 Id. at 1463-64 n.125 (citing NATIONAL GAY TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN
VICTIMIZATION 24 (June 1984)).
172 Id. at 1464 (quoting PETER FINN & TAYLOR MCNEIL, THE RESPONSE OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO BIAS CRIME: AN EXPLORATORY REVIEW 2 (1987)).
I73 ld. at 1465.
174 Id. at 1463 (quoting the coordinator of a victim assistance program at a New York
City hospital).
15 Id. at 1466 (quoting a physician from a San Francisco hospital).
176 Id. For other illustrations, see id. at 1462-70.
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This extraordinary level of antipathy is the tip of a large iceberg. Those who
attack gays are atypical, but they reveal much about the culture in which
they have been socialized. Their behavior can hardly be characterized as
aberrant or isolated when it is so common throughout the United States.
According to Gordon Allport's classic study of prejudice, patterns of
behavior rejecting out-groups form a continuum, from verbal denunciation
(what Allport calls "antilocution"), to avoidance, to discrimination, to physi-
cal attack, to organized extermination. The milder forms of prejudice are
the most common: "most people are content to express their hostility verbal-
ly to their own friends and never go further. Some, however, reach the stage
of active discrimination. A few take part in vandalism, riots, lynchings."'"7
When violence does occur, it "is always an outgrowth of milder states of
mind. Although most barking (antilocution) does not lead to biting, yet there
is never a bite without previous barking."' 79 The perpetrators of hate vio-
lence are predominantly young males, who are distinguished from their
elders primarily in that they "have a thinner layer of socialized habit be-
tween impulses and their release."'' 0 Others, however, are likely to mani-
fest similar attitudes in other, more socially acceptable ways. "[A]ny nega-
tive attitude tends somehow, somewhere, to express itself in action. Few
people keep their antipathies entirely to themselves. The more intense the
attitude, the more likely it is to result in vigorously hostile action.''.
While few Americans actually engage in violence against gays, many
more dislike gays intensely. Gays are among the least liked groups in the
United States, according to Kenneth Sherrill's analysis of the Feeling Ther-
mometers of the American National Election Study." 2 Respondents were
asked to rate their feelings toward a variety of groups on a scale of 0 to
100. In four surveys spanning a ten-year period, more respondents consis-
tently assigned the lowest score, zero, to gays and lesbians than any other
group; next in order were illegal immigrants, people on welfare, and Chris-
tian fundamentalists. (In 1994, the most recent year, 28.2% assigned gays a
zero ranking, as compared with 24.2% for the next most unpopular group,
illegal immigrants, and 9.1% for the third most unpopular group, people on
welfare. The figure for blacks was 2.0%.) Sherrill concludes that "such
hostility does not face any other group in the electorate."'8 3 The hostility is
not only intense, but widespread. Gays and lesbians also have consistently
received one of the lowest mean FT scores, though in recent years they have
'77 See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
178 Id. at 49.
179 Id. at 57.
'80 Id. at 59.
1s1 Id. at 14.
182 See Kenneth Sherrill, The Political Power of Lesbians, Gays & Bisexuals, 29 PS
469, 470 (1996).
183 Id. at 470.
19971 125.
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escaped the lowest average rating by being two to four points above illegal
immigrants. "Among American citizens included in these studies only les-
bians and gay men were the objects of cold feelings from a majority of
Americans."''
The idea that gays are inferior human beings is not the only reason they
are discriminated against, but it plainly is one of the reasons. Both homo-
sexual activity and homosexual desire are stigmatized. The stigma cannot be
explained simply in terms of the perceived immorality of the desired con-
duct. The trouble is not homosexual conduct, but homosexual identity.'85
This problem can be shown by focusing on the mildest form of preju-
dice in Allport's continuum-verbal denunciation. Richard Mohr notes that
the English language does not treat gays merely as persons who engage in
certain sexual activities. Dictionary definitions of "homosexual" refer to
desire rather than conduct.'86 Anti-gay slurs also target status rather than
behavior:
With the apparent exception of "cocksucker," no widespread
anti-gay slur gives any indication that its censure is directed
at sex acts rather than despised social status. Group-directed
slurs (dyke, queer, fag) place gays in a significant social
category along with blacks (nigger, shine, shitskin), other
184 Id.
185 John Boswell has put the point with characteristic force:
[M]ost modern hostility has little if anything to do with the specific "activities"
performed by gay people. It is being a homosexual that disturbs most of the pub-
lic, from school systems to the U.S. Army. What people do in private ... is of
much less concern than what they say in public. "Avowed homosexuals" are
excluded from the ministry of nearly all church denominations, even if they
choose to be celibate. What is at issue is the category, a category independent of
any sexual activity. The allegedly antisocial behavior known as "flaunting"-a
focus in such anti-gay campaigns as that of Anita Bryant-does not involve any
genital activity at all: it refers to public honesty and openness about one's erotic
feelings. "Pansy," "queer," and "faggot" allude not to explicit, dangerous acts, but
to private, invisible preferences, or even such personal and--one might have
thought-unthreatening aspects of an individual as his aesthetic taste or the way
he walks or holds his hands in conversation. Violence against gay people on the
streets of American cities arises not from the observation of prohibited acts,
which almost all gay people perform out of view, but from the surmise that some-
one is a lesbian or a gay man .... [lI]t is unrelated to any external activity: the
aim is to punish, injure, or eliminate persons who are gay.
John Eastburn Boswell, Jews, Bicycle Riders, and Gay People: The Determination of
Social Consensus and Its Impact on Minorities, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 225-26
(1989).
186 See RICHARD MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION: WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST
STAND UP FOR GAY RIGHTS 60 (1994).
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racial groups (chink), women (cunt, gash), various ethnic
groups (wop, dago, gook, jap, JAP, mick, kike) ... . They
do not place gays in the same category as liars, hypocrites,
murderers, and thieves-those who commit immoral and
criminal actions and yet for whom culture in no case has
coined group-based invectives. This schema of slurs strongly
suggests that gays are held to be immoral because they are
hated, rather than hated because they are immoral. 7
Judge Richard Posner, no gay rights advocate,"u has acknowledged
that homosexuals "are despised more for what they are than for what they
do."' 89 He notes that laws prohibiting homosexual sex are marked by "a
gratuitousness, an egregiousness, a cruelty, and a meanness" that is unusu-
al.'90 Even homosexuals who do not act on, or even who openly repudiate,
their inclinations, still bear the stigma of their status, if it is known. In 1976,
presidential candidate Jimmy Carter told an interviewer, "I've looked on a
lot of women with lust. I've committed adultery in my heart many times.
This is something that God recognizes I will do-and I have done it-and
God forgives me for it.'' 1 The statement caused a minor flap at the time,
but Carter went on to win the election. Imagine the reaction if he had said
that he had looked on a lot of men with lust.
The actions thought typical of gays, Mohr concludes, are stigmatized as
signs or markers for a despised status. What the effeminate
male and butch lesbian does does not matter. It is their mere
existence, mere presence, that offends. Such acts as gays are
thought to perform-whether sexual, gestural, or social-are
viewed socially as the expected or even necessary efflores-
cence of gays' lesser moral state, of their status as lesser
beings, rather than as the distinguishing marks by which they
are defined as a group. Such purported acts-the stuff of
stereotypes-provide the materials for a retrospectively con-
structed ideology concocted to justify the group's despised
status, just as, for instance, the beliefs that Jews poison wells
and kill babies and messiahs are concocted, as socially
187 Id. at 61-62.
188 For a critique of Judge Posner's work from a gay rights perspective, see William
N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps
Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333 (1992).
189 RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 346 (1992).
190 Id.
'9' JULES WITCOVER, MARATHON: THE PURSUIT OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1972-1976, at
566 (1977) (quoting Jimmy Carter).
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"needed," to justify society's hatred of Jews. Hatred's target-
ing of status is primitive, and its condemnation of behavior
an ideologically inspired afterthought.'92
2. Stereotyping
Stereotyping of gays is problematic even if it is not merely a manifesta-
tion of hatred. Consider the Senate Committee's fantasies described earli-
er, 193 or, more pertinently here, the mendacious stereotypes about gays that
the supporters of Amendment 2 deployed. Colorado for Family Values was
the organization that drafted and principally led the campaign for Amend-
ment 2. Its principal pamphlet, delivered to 800,000 Colorado doorsteps
before the election, claimed, inter alia, that "sexual molestation of children
is a large part of many homosexuals' lifestyle," that such molestation "is
actually an accepted part of the homosexual community!", that gays are
"rich, 'horny', political power brokers," and that gay rights ordinances pro-
tect sexual intercourse in public places, would require employers to con-
struct separate bathrooms for gays, would impose legal penalties upon
churches and individuals who preach that homosexuality is wrong, and
"could force churches to unite homosexuals in marriage." 9 Members of
Colorado for Family Values evidently judged that at least some of their
audience was predisposed to credit silly claims of this sort.
Ely explains why stereotyping of this kind violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. "The cases where we ought to be suspicious are ... those
involving a generalization whose incidence of counterexample is significant-
ly higher than the legislative authority appears to have thought it was."' 9
This is because such a generalization denies those people who are
counterexamples, and to whose existence the decisionmaker is oblivious,
"their right to equal concern and respect, by valuing their welfare at ze-
ro.' '196 The danger of such devaluation is particularly great when the group
in question is one to which the decisionmakers do not belong. People are
especially likely to subscribe to self-flattering generalizations and to nega-
tive myths about outsiders. "Just as we would want reconsidered any impor-
192 MOHR, supra note 186, at 65-66.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
'94 COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, EQUAL RIGHTS-NOT SPECIAL RIGHTS! (1992).
See generally Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to
Social Science Research, 1 LAw & SEXUALITY 133 (1991) (cataloguing common, de-
monstrably false stereotypes).
195 ELY, supra note 50, at 157.
19 Id.
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tant decision that was made under the influence of an erroneous assumption
about the relevant facts, so should we here.' 97
It seems likely that the Court recognized the existence of both of these
motives. Moreover, in assessing whether Romer was correctly decided, we
also ought to take note of two other constitutionally impermissible purposes
that are pervasive in American society and underlie the stigmatization of
homosexuality, both of which appear to have escaped the Court's notice.
3. Sexism
One of these constitutionally impermissible motives is the desire to
impose traditional sex roles on others. Any action that singles out homo-
sexuals facially classifies on the basis of sex. If a business fires Ricky, or if
the state prosecutes him, because of his sexual activities with Fred, while
these actions would not be taken against Lucy if she did exactly the same
things with Fred, then Ricky is being discriminated against on the basis of
his sex. Here, as elsewhere, the facial classification reveals something im-
portant about purpose. The link between heterosexism and sexism is com-
mon knowledge. Most Americans learn no later than high school that one of
the nastier sanctions that one will suffer if one deviates from the behavior
traditionally deemed appropriate to one's sex is the imputation of homosex-
uality. The two stigmas-sex-inappropriateness and homosexuality-are
virtually interchangeable, and each is readily used as a metaphor for the
other. Moreover, both stigmas have gender-specific forms that imply that
men ought to have power over women. Gay men are stigmatized as effemi-
nate, which means insufficiently aggressive and dominant. Lesbians are
stigmatized as too aggressive and dominant; they appear to be guilty of
some kind of insubordination. As was true in Brown,'98 the findings of
scholarship reinforce what common sense already tells us. Numerous studies
by social psychologists have found that support for traditional sex roles is
strongly correlated with (and in some studies is the best single predictor of)
disapproval of homosexuality. Historians chronicling the rise of the modern
despised category of "the homosexual" have found similar connections with
sexism.'99
197 Id.
198 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
199 1 have developed the claims made in this paragraph at much greater length in
Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Dis-
crimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). This argument has been subject to some
misunderstanding. My claim is not that gender role deviance is "the total explanation
for homophobia." See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV.
45, 82 (1996); see also Roderick M. Hills, You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case
Against Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1588, 1608-12 (1997). I specifically disavow that argument. See Koppelman, supra, at
19971
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Doubtless it never occurred to the Court that discrimination against gays
is a kind of sex discrimination. If it had, then Romer would have been an
easy case, squarely controlled by Hunter v. Erickson.2' If Hunter involved
an explicitly racial classification, then Amendment 2 equally involved an
explicit gender classification; under the Amendment, men, but not women,
who sleep with men may be freely discriminated against."° Viewing
Amendment 2 as sex discrimination would have been a simpler and more
automatic path to heightened scrutiny, but it is not the path that the Court,
took.
4. Imposition of Religious Belief
Finally, much of the reason homosexuality is stigmatized is that many
Americans are Christians or Jews who interpret the Bible as forbidding
homosexual conduct. Motivation of this kind does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment because it does not deny anyone equal concern and respect.
The equal dignity of all human beings is a foundational belief in both Juda-
ism and Christianity; as an historical matter, contemporary secular liberals
got the idea of equal dignity from these faiths.2 2 Religious motives, how-
ever, may run afoul of other considerations. The Supreme Court has held
that, to be constitutional, a law must "have a secular legislative pur-
pose."2"3 This does not mean that religious motivation invalidates a statute,
but it does mean that a law must be defensible in secular terms. Kent
Greenawalt has explained why religious arguments are not a proper basis for
state action:
255-57 n. 222. My causal claim is a good deal more modest: that the homosexuality
taboo
is crucially dependent on sexism, without which it might well not exist. And
when the state enforces that taboo, it is giving its imprimatur to sexism. As with
the miscegenation taboo, the effect that the taboo against homosexuality has in
modern American society is, in large part, the maintenance of illegitimate hierar-
chy; the taboo accomplishes this by reinforcing the identity of the superior caste
in the hierarchy, and this effect is at least in large part the reason why the taboo
persists.
Id. at 255-57 (footnotes omitted).
393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating an amendment to a city charter requiring a ma-
jority of electors to approve proposed ordinances regulating realty transactions on the
basis of race).
201 Sunstein has already noted the availability of this kind of argument. See Sunstein,
supra note 6, at 64. J.M. Balkin also appears to think that Romer ought to have been
disposed of on the basis of a sex discrimination argument. See Balkin, supra note 169,
at 2361-73.
202 See Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 817, 846 (1993).
203 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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A liberal society.., has no business dictating matters of
religious belief and worship to its citizens. It cannot forbid
or require forms of belief, it cannot preclude acts of worship
that cause no secular harm, it cannot restrict expression
about what constitutes religious truth. One needs only a
modest extension of these uncontroversial principles to con-
clude that a liberal society should not rely on religious
grounds to prohibit activities that either cause no secular
harm or do not cause enough secular harm to warrant their
prohibition.'
This does not mean that a law is invalid if it was enacted with religious
motives; that would mean, as Michael McConnell has argued, "that those whose
understandings of justice are derived from religious sources are second-class
citizens, forbidden to work for their principles in the public sphere.""2 5 It does,
however, mean that those with moral objections to homosexual conduct have an
obligation to translate those objections into secular terms.2" "The absence of a
strong secular justification for the categorization is the best evidence that the
program favors religion over nonreligion, or one religion over another."' 7
Efforts to translate religious objections to homosexual conduct into secular
terms have been, at least as of this writing, a conspicuous failure.2 8 Thus,
there is some reason to suspect that even if some of the purposes of laws
discriminating against gays do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, those
purposes nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause.
D. Invidious Motive and Amendment 2
Laws, such as Amendment 2, that target gays for disadvantage are the prod-
uct of a political process contaminated by constitutionally impermissible mo-
204 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 90-91
(1988).
' Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 144 (1992).
See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) ("No suggestion has
been made that Arkansas' law [prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools]
may be justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some
of its citizens.").
7 McConnell, supra note 205, at 144.
208 The most sophisticated effort at such translation is that of the new natural law
theorists, most prominently John Finnis. I describe and critique their arguments in An-
drew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J. JURIS. (forthcoming
1997).
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tives. It is only when this cultural background is kept in view that it becomes
clear why Amendment 2's singling out of gays for broad disadvantage is consti-
tutionally fatal. Judicial suspicion that such motives were at work is confirmed
by the language of the Amendment, which had "the peculiar property of impos-
ing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group."2' Justice
Kennedy was right to focus on this unusual property, which appears to have
tipped the scales against the law (though the opinion would have made a good
deal less sense if some other group had been named). Thus, a law that does not
single out a "named group," such as a slightly redrafted Amendment 2 that
merely substitutes "sexual orientation" for "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation," would present a harder case."' But unless there were reliable
background knowledge of hatred and stereotyping of gays, even the inference of
animus in Romer would have been unwarranted.
The core constitutional objection to Amendment 2 is that, absent invidious
motives, it probably would not have passed. The key, though not necessarily
fatal, weakness of that objection is that its judgment of probability reasonably
can be disputed. Invidious prejudices certainly contribute to the passage of laws
of this kind, but they are mixed with permissible motives. Justice Scalia's claim
that "the only sort of 'animus' at issue here" was "moral disapproval of homo-
sexual conduct" '' was surely a correct description of many, perhaps most, of
those who voted for Amendment 2. On the other hand, these voters had some
allies who had pretty unsavory motives. Sorting them out, and determining
whether the impermissible motives were the determinative ones, seems an im-
possible task.
The existence of such mixed motives is not a new difficulty, however. It is
the innocent explanation problem again. Almost any law can be given some
innocent explanation. What is more, any such innocent explanation usually will
correctly characterize the motives of some of its supporters. For example, prob-
ably the most severe attribution of invidious legislative purpose in any Supreme
Court opinion was its declaration, in Loving v. Virginia,"' that laws prohibit-
ing interracial marriage were "measures designed to maintain White Suprema-
cy." '213 The Court stated this in the teeth of a perfectly innocent alternate ex-
209 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
210 The amendment,(with new words emphasized) would read:
No Protected Status Based on Sexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall en-
act, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby sexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section
of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
211 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
213 Id. at 11.
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planation that the Commonwealth of Virginia had offered. In its brief, Virginia
argued that if the Court were to undertake an inquiry into the wisdom of the
challenged legislation, "it would quickly find itself mired in a veritable
Serbonian bog of conflicting scientific opinion upon the effects of interracial
marriage, and the desirability of preventing such alliances, from the physical,
biological, genetic, anthropological, cultural, psychological and sociological
point of view."214 It argued that the decision not to allow such marriages rest-
ed on the acceptance of scientific arguments put forth by respectable authorities.
If an innocent explanation was all that was needed, here it was. Moreover, it is
nearly certain that at least some of Virginia's leaders had managed to persuade
themselves that these scientific claims were true. The appellants responded that
"there is not a single anthropologist teaching at a major university in the United
States who subscribes to the theory that Negro-white matings cause biologically
deleterious results, '215 but the Court certainly was not competent to adjudicate
this dispute. Moreover, under motive-based analysis, even if the law rested on
bogus science, this would not necessarily have impugned the legislators' mo-
tives. Innocent mistakes are not invidious.
Instead, the Court emphasized that "Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest
solely upon distinctions drawn according to race" 216 Such distinctions are
"odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality. 21 7 The Court supported its attribution of invidious purpose by noting
that "Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons, 2 8
but it also indicated that Virginia would not be able to cure the difficulty by
enacting a more broadly worded statute. 9
In both Loving and Romer, the kind of classification that was used triggered
a presumption of unconstitutionality, which the state was unable to overcome.
In both cases, the triggering of that presumption was appropriate because the
classifications in question were ones that were widely understood to separate
those citizens who were fully human from the untermenschen. The use of such
classifications sufficed to raise a serious doubt about the legitimacy of the laws'
motivations.
Once such a doubt has been raised, legislation can no longer be presumed
to be constitutional.
[The Equal Protection Clause] does not require a plaintiff to
prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially
discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legisla-
214 Brief of Appellee at 41, Loving (No. 395).
215 Brief for Appellants at 37, Loving (No. 395).
216 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
217 Id. at 11 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
218 Id.
219 See id. at 12 n.11 ("[W]e find the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant
to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect
the 'integrity' of all races.").
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ture or administrative body operating under a broad mandate
made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or
even that a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "prima-
ry" one. In fact, it is because legislators and administrators
are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing
considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits
of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irra-
tionality. But racial discrimination is not just another com-
peting consideration. When there is proof that a discriminato-
ry purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this
judicial deference is no longer justified.22
The doctrine of suspect classification rests on the judgment that, whenever a
classification of a certain sort is used, a court is justified in presuming that
"a motivating factor in the decision" was the illicit motive ordinarily associ-
ated with that classification in the minds of at least some of the citizenry. A
classification should be suspect, then, if many citizens think that the classifi-
cation in question distinguishes persons who are entitled to a full measure of
concern and respect from persons who are inherently degraded and inferior.
Sexual orientation is a classification of this sort.
Richard Duncan has argued that Romer was wrongly decided because
the draconian or unconstitutional applications that worried the Court were
unlikely ever to occur and, in any event, were not the law's primary ef-
fect.22' At oral argument, the justices had wondered whether the Amend-
2 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977) (footnotes omitted). The Court here cited Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thomp-
son: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT.
REV. 95, who argues at pages 117-18:
If the decisionmaker gave weight to an illicit objective, the court should presume
that his consideration of the objective determined the outcome of the decision and
should invalidate the decision in the absence of clear proof to the contrary .... In
this case, proof that the decisionmaker took account of an illicit objective rebuts
whatever presumption of regularity otherwise attaches. For this reason, and be-
cause of the constitutional interests at stake, the court should place on the
decisionmaker a heavy burden of proving that his illicit objective was not deter-
minative of the outcome.
See also id. at 119 (footnotes omitted):
A complainant who can prove that, but for the decisionmaker's desire to promote
an illicit objective, the decision would not have been made, should clearly have
won his case. But such rigorous proof is not essential. It should suffice to demon-
strate that illicit motivation played a non-trivial part in the decisionmaking pro-
cess, so that it might have affected the outcome. Whichever of these ways one
poses the inquiry, it is inappropriate to ask which of several possible objectives
was "sole" or "dominant" in the decisionmaker's mind: an illicit motive may have
been "subordinate" and yet have determined the outcome of the decision.
"22 Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf. Supreme Court Storytelling,
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ment would authorize libraries to refuse to lend books to gays, hospitals to
deny gays access to kidney dialysis, or the police, the health department,
and the insurance commissioner to engage in similar discriminatory denials
of services.222 The Amendment's literal language might have authorized
such discrimination, but these scenarios were unlikely and might have been
cured by a narrow interpretation of the Amendment. Duncan tellingly cites
Justice Kennedy's observation, in another context, that courts should not
invalidate laws "on a facial challenge based upon a worst-case analysis that
may never occur." '223
Duncan's question, "But why should we think these scenarios will ever
occur or were intended by the voters of Colorado when they approved the
initiative?", 2" deserves an answer. The evidence of actual discriminatory
animus is sparse. The offending, overbroad language of the Amendment did
not even appear on the ballot, which contained only a summary of the law.
Survey data does not turn up convincing evidence of impermissible animus
in the Colorado electorate.2' Michael Dorf observes that if the reason ob-
jective impermissible purpose voids a statute "is because the objective fea-
tures of the statute provide clear evidence of the subjective goals of the
legislature," then "one would expect that on occasion a statute with an ob-
jective impermissible purpose could be defended on the ground that, al-
the Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 passim (1997).
2 See U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript at *25, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct.
1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 605822 (U.S. Oral Argument Oct. 10, 1995).
' Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990), quoted in
Duncan, supra note 221, at 354.
Duncan; supra note 221, at 354.
A poll conducted a month after the vote by an independent survey firm on behalf
of the Denver Post and KCNC-TV showed that 81% of voters surveyed agreed with the
statement that "[e]xcept for their choice of sexual partners, homosexuals are not really
different from anyone else." Only 6% agreed that "[a] homosexual is more likely to
sexually molest children than a person who is heterosexual." Only 13% agreed that
"[h]omosexual behavior should be against the law, even if it occurs between consenting
adults." Talmey-Drake Research & Strategy, Inc., December, 1992 Issues Poll. (The
state's lawyers cite this data to argue that Scalia's analysis of voter motivation is the
correct one. See Tymkovich et al., supra note 4, at 331.) Indeed, it appears that most
Colorado voters supported the idea that people should not be denied a job or housing
based on sexual orientation. Amendment 2's proponents evidently succeeded in inducing
voters to believe that Amendment 2 was principally about affirmative action, which
many opposed. See Schacter, supra note 62, at 393, citing Evan Gerstmann, At the
Constitutional Crossroads: Gays, Lesbians, and the Failure of Class Based Equal Protec-
tion (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison); Jane S.
Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equiva-
lents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 300-07 (1994). It is not unusual for voters to
be confused about the referenda they are voting upon. Nor is it unusual for proponents
and opponents of ballot measures to deliberately compound voters' confusion. See Eule,
supra note 107, at 1515-18 (1990).
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though the statute appears to serve only an impermissible purpose, in fact it
was enacted for different, permissible purposes. 22 6 This is just what
Duncan is saying. Duncan concedes that Amendment 2 may look as though
it was animated by a bare desire to harm gays, but he thinks that the totality
of the evidence of the lawmakers' subjective purposes should lead us to a
different conclusion.
The judicial limitations already noted forbid this move, however.227 We
decided in the first place to look to objective, rather than subjective, purpose
because (a) it is very hard confidently to attribute any particular motive to a
collective group; (b) courts are rightly reluctant to challenge other officials'
motives; and (c) this reluctance means that a motive-based test will bias the
judiciary in favor of validating statutes, even those that are in fact contami-
nated by impermissible motives. All of these considerations militate against
permitting a motive-based defense to a finding of impermissible objective
purpose. It will be as difficult confidently to attribute a good subjective
motive to the decisionmakers as it was to attribute a bad one to them. The
courts' reluctance to impugn the lawmakers' motives will again bias adjudi-
cation to the detriment of Fourteenth Amendment protections; in assessing
the prima facie case against a statute, if it was hard to say that a lawmaker
had a bad motive, it will be equally hard at the rebuttal stage to deny that
the lawmaker had a good motive. The only way to avoid this difficulty is to
forbid the parties to the litigation from putting in issue the subjective mo-
tives of the lawmaker.
Thus,.we come to the following paradox. Following the Court's interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause, the sine qua non of a violation of that
Clause, is unconstitutional subjective motive. A well-crafted set of imple-
menting rules, however, will push subjective motive so far outside the scope
of inquiry (at least in cases where the person challenging the law does not
directly put motive in issue) that evidence of motive, in fact, will become
entirely irrelevant to the adjudication of the law's constitutionality, perhaps
to the point of being inadmissible in court.
I recognize the contingent and contestable nature of my judgment. Rea-
sonable people disagree about whether hatred and stereotyping of gays is
sufficiently pervasive in our society to warrant judicial suspicion of laws
that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Romer, therefore, is a
hard case. An objective test of suspectness must rely on objective social
26 Letter from Michael Dorf, Associate Professor, Columbia University School of
Law, to Andrew Koppelman (Nov. 6, 1996) (on file with author). Our correspondence
was prompted by Professor Dorf's fine article, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994).
22 These limitations have long been emphasized by Justice Scalia, who thinks that it
is almost never appropriate for courts to rely on extrinsic evidence of legislators' mean-
ing. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 650-56
(1990).
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meanings, and these are always going to be contested. But this does not,
without more, impugn the result. If the Court is not altogether going to
abdicate its Fourteenth Amendment role, then it has to make its own best
judgment.2m
IV. WHAT ABOUT HARDWICK?
If this reading of Romer is correct, then the case has far-reaching impli-
cations. Charles Black wrote of Brown that "the venial fault of the opinion
consists in its not spelling out that segregation ... is perceptibly a means of
ghettoizing the imputedly inferior race."229 The Romer opinion has a simi-
lar fault. In neither case, however, does this fault necessarily impugn the
result. The cultural information that is omitted from both opinions is easily
supplied by the reader. If, however, the key element in this equation is the
recognition of the invidiously stigmatized status of gays, that recognition
cannot be confined to the facts of Romer. It is precisely this kind of back-
ground knowledge that the Court relies on when concluding that a given
type of classification warrants heightened scrutiny as a general matter. Even
though Romer does not so much as intimate that sexual orientation is a
suspect classification, it nonetheless is a step in that direction. Romer found
that there exists a non-empty set of laws targeting gays that are unconstitu-
tional because they reflect an impermissible animus against the group. 3
For a defense of the legitimacy of adjudication of hard cases, even those in which
the arguments are equally strong on both sides, see Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 587-92 (1993).
229 Black, supra note 166, at 430.
230 There appears to be at least one member of this set of laws in addition to Amend-
ment 2. Shortly after Romer, the Court vacated and remanded a decision upholding an
amendment to the Cincinnati Charter, the wording of which was nearly identical to that
of the Colorado amendment. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519
(1996). On remand, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier decision, see Equality Found.
v. City of Cincinnati, 1997 WL 656228 (6th Cir. 1997), but in order to do so, it was
compelled to distinguish Romer on the basis of factors, such as Amendment 2's
"interfer[ence] with the expression of local community preferences," id. at *7, that had
been given no weight at all in the Supreme Court's opinion. Arthur Leonard observes
that the Sixth Circuit's opinion "adopts and embellishes (without citation)" the argu-
ments made by Justice Scalia in his dissent from the remand. Arthur S. Leonard, 6th
Circuit Sustains Cincinnati Ballot Measure, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES, Nov. 1997, at 157.
The decision thus rests on a basis that has already been rejected by a majority of the
Court. Leonard reports that the plaintiffs intend to seek either en banc review or certio-
rari before the Supreme Court. See id at 158.
Another likely member of the set is the recent Defense of Marriage Act, which is
as indiscriminate as Amendment 2 in the injury it inflicts on gays, and as difficult to
defend in the details of its applications. See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA:
Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
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Once that finding is made, it becomes reasonable to ask, of any law that
facially discriminates against gays, whether it is a member of that set.
Given the widespread prejudice against gays, minimal scrutiny of laws
that target them is at least sometimes inappropriate, and Romer shows that
the Court is disposed, at least implicitly, to recognize this. Has the way then
been paved for heightened scrutiny of such laws as a general matter? Will
sexual orientation become at least a quasi-suspect classification? Romer can
easily be read as a precursor of that development. Thus Lino Graglia: "The
Court was obviously unwilling, for public relations reasons, to openly de-
clare homosexuality a 'suspect criterion.""'23 But there is an alternative ex-
planation of why the Court did not drop the other shoe.
Return to the problem with which we began. Can Romer be reconciled
with Bowers v. Hardwick,32 in which the Court held that a law
criminalizing homosexual sodomy does not violate the Due Process Clause?
Justice Kennedy did not mention the earlier case in his opinion, and when
asked the question in an interview, he would not answer it.233 In this final
section of this Essay, I will suggest that Hardwick is an obstacle, though not
necessarily an insuperable one, to heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation
classifications. It is this obstacle-not merely the precedent, but the defensi-
ble principle for which it stands-that is the reason for the Court's hesita-
tion.
Citing with approval several lower court opinions, Justice Scalia rea-
soned that, after Hardwick, it would be anomalous to deem gays a protected
class under the Equal Protection Clause.2" Without more, this argument is
a non sequitur. It implicitly assumes that if a law does not violate one provi-
sion of the Constitution, then it cannot violate any other constitutional com-
1997).
231 Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the Constitution,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 424 (1997).
232 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 82, 90. "I'm not
going to comment," Justice Kennedy told his interviewer. "It will be interesting to see
how Romer is understood." Id.
14 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Sha-
lom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-66 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1003 (1990). This reasoning was rejected in Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d
1329, 1345-49 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546-47
(D. Kan. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); cf Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting a privacy challenge to a statute disal-
lowing same-sex marriages while sustaining an equal protection challenge to that same
statute).
138 [Vol. 6:1
ROMER V. EVANS AND INVIDIOUS INTENT
mand either.235 Due process and equal protection are two distinct constitu-
tional provisions, and there is no reason to presume that a law permitted by
one provision is also permitted by every other.2"
There is, however, an argument that can be made for linking due pro-
cess and equal protection in the way that Scalia attempts to. The Court has
sometimes suggested that in order to be a fundamentally unfair basis of
classification, which is the gravamen of an equal protection claim, a trait
must be irrelevant to any (or almost any) legitimate state purpose.2 37 This
means that, in order to adjudicate an equal protection claim, a court must
canvass the range of possible legitimate state purposes and decide whether
the purposes proffered on behalf of the challenged law are legitimate. That
same extratextual inquiry undergirds a due process claim, in which the issue
is whether the state has a sufficient basis for infringing on the liberty of the
person challenging the law.
This means that when courts decide whether homosexuality should be
deemed a suspect classification, it is relevant that the legitimacy of the
state's purposes in suppressing homosexual conduct was already put into
question in Hardwick. In Hardwick, the Court decided that the promotion of
morality was a sufficient basis for criminalizing sodomy.238 According to
Hardwick, then, there is a legitimate state interest in discouraging homosex-
ual conduct.239 If that is true for due process purposes, then it must also be
23" See Koppelman, supra note 123, at 187-88. The Court in Hardwick expressly de-
clared that it was not deciding the equal protection question. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at
196 n.8.
236 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 67-69.
17 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(declining to declare mental retardation a suspect classification).
23 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
9 Even if one thinks that Hardwick wrongly decided the privacy issue, one can still
endorse its holding that the promotion of morality is a legitimate state interest. For
example, John Finnis thinks that homosexual conduct is morally wrong, see Law, Mo-
rality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1063-70 (1994), and
that the state "should deliberately and publicly identify, discourage and hinder the harm-
ful and evil," id. at 1076, but he denies "that that rationale requires or authorizes the
state to direct people to virtue and deter them from vice by making even secret and
truly consensual adult acts of vice a punishable offence against the state's laws." Id.; cf
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the repeal of sodomy
laws "does not necessarily abandon the view that homosexuality is morally wrong and
socially harmful," and often "simply reflects the view that enforcement of such criminal
laws involves unseemly intrusion into the intimate lives of citizens"); Lynn D. Wardle,
A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 1, 58-62. I disagree with Finnis about the morality of homosexual conduct, see
generally Koppelman, supra note 208, but I agree that the state can legitimately pro-
mote morality. I have argued at length that the encouragement of an anti-racist and anti-
sexist ethic is a legitimate undertaking for a liberal state. See generally Koppelman,
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true for equal protection purposes.24
The existence of a legitimate purpose is not, however, dispositive for
equal protection analysis. Cass Sunstein has observed that a crucial distinc-
tion between due process and equal protection claims is that the former are
backward-looking, protecting, traditionally valued liberties, while the latter
are forward-looking and self-consciously directed against tradition in the
name of equality."' The distinction that is more relevant to process-based
equal protection analysis is that between result and motive. The Due Process
Clause protects citizens from being injured in important ways, and is indif-
ferent to the state's motives. In equal protection analysis, however, motive is
central.
The analysis in Hardwick turned on the importance, or lack thereof, of
the asserted liberty. The Court rejected Hardwick's claim because the right
to engage in homosexual sodomy is neither "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty" nor "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.
242
Hardwick's interest in engaging in sodomy was deemed (at least constitu-
tionally) trivial, so that the state did not need much justification in order to
infringe on that interest. When the Court suspects invidious motive, on the
other hand, it does not matter if the discrimination is about something trivi-
al. A city could not permissibly distribute one lollipop to each white child
who resides within its limits. If the Court suspects that an illicit motive is
involved, then the state has a serious burden of proving the relevance of
laws that discriminate against a group. 3
Still, a realistic analysis properly concludes that after Hardwick, the
granting of protected status to gays under the Equal Protection Clause would
be surprising. As Laurence Tribe observed,
The fact that the Court in [Hardwick] went out of its way to
create a line between heterosexuals and homosexuals, where
there was none in the challenged sodomy statute, merely to
preserve prosecution of homosexuals under the law from
supra note 162.
240 For a similar analysis of the relationship between gays' due process and equal
protection claims, see Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 373, 380-81 (1997).
24, See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161
(1988); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 67-69.
2 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
243 Thus, Ely, for example, can dismiss the substantive due process claim raised in
Hardwick, see ELY, supra note 55, at 22, while acknowledging that the equal protection
claims of gays are more complicated and colorable. See ELY, supra note 50, at 161-70.
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constitutional infirmity, indicates how unlikely it is that
homosexuality will be deemed quasi-suspect in the near
future.'
Romer upsets a sound realist prediction. It is not clear, however, that this
gives anyone a right to complain. Realist predictions are not the law.
There is no doctrinal inconsistency between the Court's decisions in
Hardwick and Romer,245 but this is not to say that the result in Hardwick
is secure. Numerous statutes in American history have specifically prohibit-
ed interracial fornication.2" Since fornication is not a fundamental right,
any privacy-based challenge to such laws would have failed. If there had
been precedents rejecting such privacy claims, the Court would not have
needed to overrule them in order to hold the very same statutes unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause.'7 Similarly, a sodomy law that
facially discriminates against gays, such as remains on the books in five
states, is valid under Hardwick but might still be invalidated on equal pro-
tection grounds.2"
The real stumbling block in this analysis is that there is an ambiguity in
the Court's equal protection doctrine. Suspect classifications are sometimes
described as those that are "seldom relevant to the achievement of any legit-
244 TRIBE, supra note 135, at 1616 n.47; see also POSNER, supra note 189, at 348-49:
having upheld state sodomy laws against a 'sexual privacy' challenge (nominally
under the due process clause) in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court would
hardly turn around and strike them down in the name of equal protection ....
The Court is not so enamored of doctrinal niceties.... It has made its lack of
sympathy for the claims of homosexuals plain enough.
241 1 thus disagree with those commentators who are confident that Romer has implic-
itly overruled Hardwick. See Grey, supra note 240; Seidman, supra note 9, at 82.
Whether anything remains of Hardwick as a practical matter is a harder question, for
the reasons set forth below.
246 See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding such a statute).
247 In fact, the Court did hold such statutes unconstitutional. See McLaughlin v. Flori-
da, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (rejecting a Florida statute which prohibited cohabitation of a
"white person" and a "negro"). It would have been unfortunate if such a privacy case
had arisen. It would have been still more unfortunate if the Court, faced with a prose-
cution of an interracial couple under a statute prohibiting fornication simpliciter, had
behaved in the way it did in Hardwick by announcing that the question before it was
whether there was a right to "interracial fornication," and expressly reserving the issue
of whether "monoracial fornication" was protected. Nonetheless, such ill-advised dicta
could not have posed any obstacle to the later invalidation of the statute on equal pro-
tection grounds. Cf Sunstein, supra note 6, at 67 n.307 (explaining that Loving v. Vir-
.ginia could have been challenged on equal protection grounds if the due process attack
had been unsuccessful).
2" See Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 149-53 (1988).
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imate state interest," 9 but this makes little sense; why make it hard for
government to rely on such classifications on the rare occasions when they
are relevant? The real problem is that suspect classifications signal invidious
intent. If, however, government can often point to a colorable reason for
relying on such a classification, then it is not clear whether a presumption of
unconstitutionality is justified.
Hardwick establishes that sexual orientation is a "distinguishing charac-
teristic[] relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement."'
Once it is stipulated that homosexual acts are harmful in some way that the
state can permissibly cognize, then discrimination against gays is indisput-
ably rational. "[B]ecause adults having sex with children is rationally
thought harmful," Thomas Grey writes, "a school district surely could ratio-
nally disqualify as a teacher someone who had asserted (1) sexual desire
(whether homosexual or heterosexual) for young adolescents and (2) a belief
that relations of this sort could be genuinely consensual and, indeed, legiti-
mate and beneficial.""' Cass Sunstein thus overreads the decision when he
writes that "tihe underlying judgment in Romer must be that, at least for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, it is no longer legitimate to dis-
criminate against homosexuals as a class simply because the state wants to
discourage homosexuality or homosexual behavior.",12 Sunstein offers a
better formulation a bit later in the same article: "if the government is going
to discriminate against homosexuals, it must do so on some ground other
than its dislike of homosexuals and homosexuality."2" There always, how-
ever, will be room for dispute as to what is the government's real reason for
enacting laws. Perhaps that is why the Court, in both Hardwick and Romer,
avoided formulating any presumption about laws that discriminate against
gays.
The reasoning of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 2 4
in which the Court enjoined the application of a law discriminating against
the mentally retarded because it reflected "irrational prejudice," " but re-
249 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). This
phrase appears in a sentence that reasons that race, alienage, and national origin "are so
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in
such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in
the burdened class are not as worthy and deserving as others." Id. The infrequent rele-
vance of those classifications does not, without more, justify the inference; this is the
Romer puzzle all over again.
20 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
2" Grey, supra note 240, at 377.
252 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 62.
253 Id. at 63-64.
154 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
255 Id. at 450.
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fused to declare the retarded a quasi-suspect class, may have influenced the
Court's decision in Romer to remain silent on the question of suspectness:
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be
instances of discrimination against [gays] that are in fact
invidious, and that are properly subject to judicial correction
under constitutional norms. But the appropriate method of
reaching such instances is not to create a new quasi-suspect
classification and subject all governmental action based on
that classification to more searching evaluation. Rather, we
should look to the likelihood that governmental action pre-
mised on a particular classification is valid as a general
matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us.
Because [sexual orientation] is a characteristic that the gov-
ernment may legitimately take into account in a wide range
of decisions ... we will not presume that any given legisla-
tive action, even one that disadvantages [gays], is rooted in
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate. 6
Romer, therefore, can be viewed as a case in which, as in Cleburne, the
Court intervened against a particularly abusive law, while prudently avoid-
ing a sweeping declaration of suspectness. This cannot, however, conclude
the inquiry. In Cleburne, the retarded had been the beneficiaries of protec-
tive legislation that "belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corre-
sponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." 7 Such ben-
eficial legislation, the court worried, might well be chilled by heightened
scrutiny." It appears that the same arguments weighed against judicial
protection of other groups who "can claim some degree of prejudice from at
least part of the public at large,"259 such as "the aging, the disabled, the
mentally ill, and the infirm. ''2' None of those groups, however, has been
subject to the degree of antipathy that gays have experienced and continue
to experience. In each of those cases, there was less warrant for a presump-
tion of impermissible motive. Tobias Barrington Wolff has observed that,
unlike Cleburne, Romer employs "a rational basis review that would be
entirely consistent with a future determination that gay people require
heightened judicial protection.'2
256 Id. at 446.
2.7 Id. at 443.
258 See id. at 444.
2-9 Id. at 445.
26 Id. at 446.
21 Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, Principled Silence, 106 YALE L.J. 247, 252
(1996). Romer certainly does not hold, as Professor Duncan claims, that "laws that
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Our answer to the suspectness question will depend on whether we think
it likely that, in most cases, laws that discriminate against gays primarily
reflect impermissible prejudice or a permissible moral judgment. An honest
answer will not cheat by collapsing one of these into the other; both are
invariably present.2 62 Reasonable people can and do disagree about which
of them, in the general run of cases, has a greater effect on gays' legal
status. Those who think that condemnation of homosexuality rests on a
sound moral judgment will find such a judgment reflected even in the most
vicious antigay violence.6 3 Those who think that the condemnation of ho-
make distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation are presumptively constitutional."
Duncan, supra note 12, at 156. Duncan attempts to support this assertion with a quota-
tion from the opinion that describes the rational basis test, see id., but he distorts the
context in which that quotation appears. The Court distinguishes a number of earlier
cases, noting that in each of those cases, the challenged law was "narrow enough in
scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for us to ascertain that there existed
some relation between the classification and the purpose it served." Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996). None of those cases involved a classification by sexual
orientation, and the Court does not assert that this test applies to "most laws taking
sexual orientation into account . . . ." Duncan, supra note 12, at 156.
262 It is unfair to the Court to accuse it of this kind of cheating, as Louis Michael
Seidman does when he writes that the Court has now "recharacterized [moral disap-
proval] as irrational animosity." Seidman, supra note 9, at 85; see also Balkin, supra
note 169, at 2317-20; Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overex-
tension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1443 (1997). The Court
did not do that; rather, it held that Amendment 2 itself appeared to be the product of
animosity and not mere moral disapproval. It may sometimes be hard to distinguish
animus from moral disapproval, but the difference, both in principle and in practice, is
often clear enough. Try to apply intelligibly to burglars Richard Posner's claim that
homosexuals "are despised more for what they are than for what they do." POSNER,
supra note 189, at 346.
No inconsistency exists in holding both that homosexual conduct can be the object
of legitimate moral objection and that much of the stigmatization of gays in American
society rests, not on this basis, but on illegitimate animus. Thus, for example, Catholic
theologian Bruce Williams's defense of the Church's teachings about the immorality of
homosexual conduct concedes that gays are often the objects of "violent and insane ha-
tred," and praises some non-Catholic ministers for being "far ahead of official Catholic
leadership in condemning Christian connivance in the cultivation of that irrational fear
and hatred of gay people which is nowadays frequently called homophobia." Bruce
Williams, Homosexuality: The New Vatican Statement, 48 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 259,
271, 275 (1987). Ralph Reed, the former executive director of the Christian Coalition,
similarly holds that "the Bible makes it clear that homosexuality is a deviation from
normative sexual conduct and God's laws," RALPH REED, ACTIVE FAITH: How CHRIS-
TIANS ARE CHANGING THE SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS 265 (1996), but also finds
"disturbing" declarations by religious conservatives "that AIDS is 'God's judgment' on
the gay community," id. at 264, and declares that "the deeply-held moral beliefs of
Christians regarding this practice do not justify hateful or spite-filled intolerance of
homosexuality." Id. at 265.
263 See, e.g., Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letters to Bishops on the
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mosexuality mainly reflects irrational prejudice will find such prejudice
reflected even in overtly religious objections.' Whether it is appropriate
for gays to be deemed a "suspect class," and for laws that discriminate
against them to be presumed unconstitutional, depends on which of these
sides is right.' No wonder the Court hesitates. I think it likely that, ab-
sent motives of raw hatred of gays, sexism, stereotyping, and religious
triumphalism, the legal status of gays would be very different than it is now.
Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (Oct. 1, 1985), 32 POPE SPEAKS 62 (1987):
It is deplorable that homosexual persons have been and are the object of violent
malice in speech or in action. Such treatment deserves condemnation from the
Church's pastors wherever it occurs. It reveals a kind of disregard for others
which endangers the most fundamental principles of a healthy society. The in-
trinsic dignity of each person must always be respected in word, in action and in
law.
But the proper reaction to crimes committed against homosexual persons
should not be to claim that the homosexual condition is not disordered. When
such a claim is made and when homosexual activity is consequently condoned, or
when civil legislation is introduced to protect behavior to which no one has any
conceivable right, neither the Church nor society at large should be surprised
when other distorted notions and practices gain ground, and irrational and violent
reactions increase.
One should also take note of Ely, who argues that the moral objection to homosex-
uality differs significantly from the moral objection to interracial sex: "I agree that such
laws are stupid and cruel, but the claim that they respond to genuine revulsion with the
act rather than constituting part of a general attempt to isolate a minority is vastly more
credible in the homosexual case." ELY, supra note 55, at 468 n.157. This is a hard sen-
tence to square with Ely's general theory; the fact that the law is "cruel" seems to indi-
cate bad motive, but its colorably moralistic character seems, in his eyes, to absolve it.
2" See, e.g., JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXU-
ALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN
ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 7 (1980):
If religious strictures are used to justify oppression by people who regularly disre-
gard precepts of equal gravity from the same moral code, or if prohibitions which
restrain a disliked minority are upheld in their most literal sense as absolutely
inviolable while comparable precepts affecting the majority are relaxed or reinter-
preted, one must suspect something other than religious belief as the motivating
cause of the oppression.
65 Romer itself, of course, does not indicate which side is right. Thus, I agree with
Professor Seidman that
[d]eciding whether Romer protects gay marriages or invalidates "don't ask/don't
tell" is ... a little like speculating about Hamlet's childhood. The opinion pro-
vides new grounds for challenging old ways of thinking, but it cannot determine
whether those challenges will ultimately succeed. For now, the only thing that is
certain is that the opinion is open to a broad construction if future courts are
disposed to so construe it. Whether they will be so disposed depends upon future
political and social developments that we cannot reliably predict.
Seidman, supra note 9, at 98.
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Because other reasonable people have different views, I am not serenely
confident of this judgment. I am certain, however, that deferential judicial
review, resting on the easy assumption that all laws addressing or affecting
homosexuality are innocently motivated, can't be the right answer.
